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Ethical, Legal, Social, and
Policy Issues in the Use of
Genomic Technology by the U.S.
Military
1

Maxwell J. Mehlman 2 & Tracy Yeheng Li
Advances in genomic science are attracting the interest of
the U.S. military for their potential to improve medical care for
members of the military and to aid in military recruitment,
training, specialization, and mission accomplishment. While
researchers have explored the ethical, legal, and social issues
raised by the use of genomic science in a wide variety of
contexts, there has been virtually no examination of these issues
in connection with the use of genomics by the military. This
article identifies potential uses of genomic science by the
military, proposes an applicable ethical and legal framework,
and applies the framework to provide ethical and legal guidance
for military decision-makers.
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I. Introduction
The U.S. military is beginning to employ genetic and genomic
science to achieve military objectives, and is planning to expand these
efforts in the future. In December 2010, JASON, a group of scientific
advisors to the military, issued a report entitled “The $100 Genome:
Implications for the Department of Defense” that outlined an
ambitious plan to employ genomic technologies to “enhance medical
status and improve treatment outcomes,” enhance “health, readiness,
and performance of military personnel,” and “know the genetic
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identities of an adversary.” 3 The report also called for the Department
of Defense (DoD) to take advantage of its “large, well-defined
population in generally good health, together with their medical
records” to “facilitate valuable longitudinal studies correlating
genotype and phenotype.” 4 The report went on to recommend that
DoD:
[D]etermine which phenotypes that might reasonably be
expected to have a genetic component have special relevance to
military performance and medical cost containment. These
phenotypes might pertain to shortand long-term medical
readiness, physical and mental performance, and response to
drugs, vaccines, and various environmental exposures, all of
which will have different features in a military context. More
specifically, one might wish to know about phenotypic responses
to battlefield stress, including post-traumatic stress disorder, the
ability to tolerate conditions of sleep deprivation, dehydration,
or prolonged exposure to heat, cold, or high altitude, or the
susceptibility to traumatic bone fracture, prolonged bleeding, or
slow wound healing. 5

The JASON report also included in its “major recommendation”
that DoD establish “policies that result in . . . the resolution of ethical
and social issues that arise from these activities.” 6 Since the inception
of the Human Genome Project in 1990, the Ethical, Legal, and Social
Implications (ELSI) Research Program within the National Human
Genome Research Institute at the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
has funded a substantial body of research on the ethical, legal, social,
and policy implications of this scientific initiative and subsequent
scientific developments. However, virtually none of this research has
addressed issues raised by the use of genomic technology by the
military. Moreover, in view of differences between the military and
civilian realms, the extent to which the insights from the ELSI
program would apply to the military is unclear.
This paper is an effort to adapt the knowledge generated by the
ELSI program to the U.S. military. It begins by describing current
and potential uses of genomic technology 7 by the military. It then
3.

JASON PROGRAM, THE $100 GENOME: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DOD 1
(Dec. 2010), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/
hundred.pdf (accessed May 2, 2014) [hereinafter, JASON Report].

4.

Id. at 43.

5.

Id.

6.

Id. at 50.

7.

Technically, the term “genetic” refers to a particular gene while
“genomic” refers to the entire genome. See Talking Glossary of Genetic
Terms, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/
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describes how civilian norms and values are a poor fit with the
military, and how this limits the application of existing ELSI findings
to the military. The paper next describes the ethical, legal, social, and
policy issues that would be raised by military genomics, and after
explaining how these issues would be resolved according to the lessons
learned in the ELSI program, it proposes how the issues should be
handled in the military. 8

II. Uses of Genomic Technology by the Military
A. Biobanks and Geno-Phenobanks

The major current use of genomic technology by the military is
collecting DNA from present and former members of the military in
order to facilitate the identification of remains. The collection, called
a biobank or biorepository, is the Armed Services Repository of
Specimen Samples for the Identification of Remains (AFRSSIR),
which was established in 1993. Every member of the military is
required to submit a blood sample to the repository upon enlistment,
and as of 2012, over 6.5 million blood samples have been collected and
stored on bloodstain cards similar to those used for newborn
screening. 9 Under current policy, AFRSSIR can retain the samples for
up to 50 years. 10 Aside from being used to identify remains, DNA
collected by the military can be decoded or sequenced, and the results
linked to medical and personnel information obtained from service
members or extracted from existing records. This results in the
creation of a “geno–phenobank,” which enables genetic and genomic
variations to be correlated with medical, physical, and other
characteristics and was one of the recommendations in the JASON
report. Several military geno–phenobanks are under construction. In
glossary/index.cfm?id=532 (last visited May 2, 2014). The remainder of
this paper uses the terms interchangeably unless the discussion requires
that either genetic or genomic technologies be addressed specifically.
8.

The JASON report also notes that “it may be beneficial to know the
genetic identities of an adversary and, conversely, to prevent an
adversary from accessing the genetic identities of U.S. military
personnel.” JASON Report, supra note 1, at 1. The report does not
elaborate, but the authors arguably have in mind the use of genetic
information in the development of weaponry. Although the ethical,
legal, and policy issues raised by the prospect of genetic weaponry are
beyond the scope of this paper, the paper considers the need to keep
genomic information about our own personnel from being used as a
weapon by adversaries as a factor in its analysis.

9.

Donna Miles, DNA Registry Unlocks Key to Fallen Servicemembers’
Identities, U.S. ARMY (Jan. 25, 2007), http://www.army.mil/article/
1508/DNA Registry Unlocks Key to Fallen Servicemembers 039
Identities/.

10.

Mayfield v. Dalton, 109 F.3d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir.1997).

118

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
Issues in the Use of Genomic Technology by the U.S. Military

2009, in collaboration with the National Institute of Mental Health,
the U.S. Army began a $65 million, 6-year “Army Study to Assess
Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers” (STARRS) to identify risk
factors for military suicides. One component of the research, the New
Soldier Study which started in February, 2011, asks new enlistees to
volunteer to complete surveys and to undergo neurological and DNA
testing to identify genetic and other risk factors. 11 As of November,
2012, 34,851 blood samples have been obtained.12 In 2012, the U.S.
Air Force Office of the Surgeon General established the “PatientCentered Precision Care Research (PC2-Z) Program,” which collects
and sequences DNA from saliva samples provided by volunteers from
the Air Force Medical Service and matches the results with their
medical information and family history. 13 The purpose of the project
is to create a “personalized medicine profile” that identifies genomic
risks for “clinically actionable, common complex diseases that are
traditionally treated in the primary care setting,” and to determine
the impact of this information on the health of the volunteers. 14
Finally, in 2011, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
established the Million Veteran Program, a geno–phenobank that
collects DNA and health information from veterans and combines it
with their VA medical records for research purposes. As of March
2014, over 240,000 veterans have enrolled. 15
In the future, the military may want to use the AFRSSIR DNA
samples for research purposes rather than just for the identification of
remains. The results of DNA sequencing could be combined with
medical and personnel records for present and former members of the
military to form a very large geno–phenobank. Aside from ELSI
concerns discussed below, such an effort may be limited by the degree
to which past records have been converted to an electronic format,
which would be necessary in order to facilitate the research project.
11.

Army STARRS New Soldier Study (NSS): The First Days of Service,
NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/
suicide-prevention/suicide-prevention-studies/army-starrs-new- soldierstudy-nss-the-first-days-of-service.shtml (last visited May 2, 2014).

12.

ARMY STARRS, ARMY STARRS BY THE NUMBERS: QUARTER 4, 2013,
available
at
http://www.armystarrs.org/sites/default
/files/
By%20the%20numbers%20Web%2020130Q4%20.pdf.

13.

Christopher E. Bradburne et al., Implementing Genome-Informed
Personalized Medicine in the U.S. Air Force Medical Service via the
Patient-Centered Precision Care Research (PC2-Z) Program, 31 JOHNS
HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST 4, 333 (2013), http://techdigest.
jhuapl.edu/TD/td3104/31 04-Bradburne.pdf (accessed May 2, 2014).

14.

Id. at 337.

15.

AKESOgen and the VA Million Veteran Program to Collaborate on
Geno- typing 105,000 Veterans, U.S. DEP’T VET. AFF. (Mar. 5, 2014),
http://www.research.va.gov/MVP/media.cfm.
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B. Genomic Testing

As noted earlier, the JASON report calls for DoD to create geno–
phenobanks to “determine which phenotypes that might reasonably
be expected to have a genetic component have special relevance to
military performance and medical cost containment.” Once these
genetic and genomic components are identified, genetic tests can be
developed to identify which individuals possess genotypes that contain
these components.
Currently, the U.S. military tests enlistees for sickle cell anemia
and Glucose 6-phosphate dehydrogenase deficiency. 16 As the field of
personalized genomic medicine expands, military physicians can be
expected to use newly developed genomic tests in the same ways as
their civilian medical colleagues, namely, to identify individual
genomic characteristics associated with the prevention, diagnosis, and
treatment of disease. For example, genetic testing can identify
individuals with genetic disorders that will not become symptomatic
until some point in the future, such as Alzheimer’s or Huntington’s
disease. In some cases, there may be steps that can be taken to
prevent or mitigate the symptoms. Genomic testing also may be able
to make or to help confirm a clinical diagnosis; the Air Force, for
example, is reported to be developing a genetic test for colorblindness
that improves upon existing detection methods. 17 As the JASON
report recognized, military physicians also increasingly will practice
pharmacogenomics, in which genomic tests help determine the
appropriate drugs to prescribe for specific patients based on their
genomic profiles. 18 Like their civilian counterparts, moreover, military
physicians might use genomic testing to identify individuals who were
at risk for genetic disorders such as breast and colorectal cancers that
can be prevented or mitigated by early detection and intervention.
Military interest in genomic testing will extend beyond the
prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of disease. The JASON report
anticipates that tests will identify individuals who have genetic
profiles that are of “special relevance to military performance and
medical cost containment.” Depending on whether test results
revealed that individuals possessed desirable or undesirable genomes,
the military could consider the results in deciding whether to
incentivize or block enlistment, or to advance or curtail military
careers, and the test results also could be useful in making duty,
16.

Susannah Baruch & Kathy Hudson, Civilian and Military Genetics:
Nondiscrimination Policy in a Post-GINA World, 83 AM. J. HUM.
GENET. 435, 439 (2008).

17.

Genevolve to Launch Military Grade DNA Test for Color Blindness,
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/5/
PRWEB (May 4, 2012),
prweb9471028.htm.

18.

JASON Report, supra note 1, at 43.
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specialization, and geographic assignments. The National Cancer
Institute, for instance, describes a young woman found to carry a
mutation in a gene that increases the risk of breast cancer who may
not be considered eligible for deployment for a 12to 15-month period
because access to recommended health care, such as MRI screening,
may not be easily accessible. 19 In 2010, a former military physician
described an officer with a family history of Huntington’s disease who
was tested to see if he had inherited the disease gene before being
promoted to flag rank, and a female pilot who was grounded after she
developed a deep vein thrombosis and genetic testing revealed that
she had a genetic mutation called Factor V Leiden polymorphism that
increases the risk of such life-threatening blood clots. 20
The military will be interested in identifying individuals with
genomic variations of general medical interest, but also mutations
that affect physical attributes that are of particular significance in
military operations. The JASON report, for example, mentions the
value of genetic testing for susceptibility to traumatic bone fracture,
prolonged bleeding, or slow wound healing. 21 In 2009, a group of
researchers published an updated human gene map for “performance
and health-related fitness phenotypes” containing over 214 entries
that may be of interest to the military. 22 The JASON report also
describes future genetic testing that would provide information about
“the ability to tolerate conditions of sleep deprivation, dehydration, or
prolonged exposure to heat, cold, or high altitude.” 23
Researchers already have developed and marketed a genetic test
that identifies one variant of the ACTN3 gene in humans, called
R577X, which codes for a protein called α-actinin-3. Individuals with
this genetic variation tend to have an abundance of slowtwitch
muscles, which are associated with activities such as long-distance
running that require endurance, while individuals who do not have
this variant of the ACTN3 gene have more fast-twitch muscles, which
are associated with activities requiring shorter bursts of energy such
as sprinting and weightlifting. Recruiters and training and assigning
19.

Cancer Genetics Risk Assessment and Counseling, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
http://www.cancer.gov/ cancertopics/pdq/genetics/risk-assessment-andcounseling/HealthProfessional/page6 (last visited May 2, 2014).

20.

Genetics and Public Policy Center, Genetics Perspectives on Policy
Seminar—Genes in Uniform: Don’t Test, Don’t Tell, GENETICS & PUB.
POL’Y
CTR.
(Jan.
10,
2006),
http://www.dnapolicy.org/
news.past.php?action=detail&past event id=25.

21.

JASON Report, supra note 1, at 43.

22.

Molly S. Bray et al., The Human Gene Map for Performance and
Health-related Fitness Phenotypes: The 2006–2007 Update, 41 Med. Sci.
Sports Exercise 35 (2009).

23.

JASON Report, supra note 1, at 43.
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officers might be interested in knowing which of these variations their
potential enlistees or trainees possessed.
Genomic testing for mental as well as physical traits will attract
the military’s attention. A considerable amount of research on genetic
variants associated with mental illness already is underway. For
example, geneticists are searching for mutations that predispose
warfighters to or protect them from post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) and have identified several genes, such as FKBP5, PACAP,
TLL1, rs263232 in ADCY8, and rs71534169 in DPP6, as susceptibility
genes for PTSD. 24 Researchers also are seeking genomic mutations
that are associated with superior mental abilities, and although claims
of success are often met with skepticism, many geneticists are
confident that genomic tests for superior mental capabilities
eventually will be developed. Scientists at the University of
Pennsylvania, for example, have created a strain of “smart” mice that
produce more of a protein called NR2B, giving them superior memory
and learning abilities. 25 Studies in humans have identified a gene
called dysbindin on chromosome 6 and another called SNAP-25 on
chromosome 20 that are associated with cognitive ability. 26 Genetic
researchers have demonstrated in mice that a genetic mutation of the
eIF2α gene and genetic manipulation of the Lynx1 gene could achieve
enhancements in synaptic plasticity, learning, and memory. 27 Studies
funded by the NIH found that people with a certain variant of the
gene catecholamine-O-methyltransferase can improve both memory
24.

See, e.g., Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Risk Prediction,
Meeting Summary, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH (Nov. 2, 2011),
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-funding/scientific-meetings/2011/
ost-traumatic-stress-disorder-ptsd-risk-prediction/index.shtml; Marilyn
C. Connelly et al., Genetics of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Review
and Recommendations for Genome-Wide Association Studies, 12 CURR.
PSYCHIATRY REP. 313 (2012); Alicia Chang, Military Experiment Seeks
to Predict PTSD, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 20, 2009),
http://www.usnews.
com/science/articles/2009/11/20/militaryexperiment-seeks-to-predict-ptsd

25.

Ya-Ping Tang et al., Genetic Enhancement of Learning and Memory in
Mice, 401 NATURE 63 (1999).

26.

Katherine E. Burdick et al., Genetic Variation in DTNBP1 Influences
General Cognitive Ability, 15 HUM. MOLECULAR GENET. 1563 (2006); M.
F. Gosso et al., Common Variants Underlying Cognitive Ability: Further
Evidence for Association between the SNAP-25 Gene and Cognition
Using a Family-Based Study in Two Independent Dutch Cohorts,7
GENES, BRAIN BEHAV. 355 (2008).

27.

Mauro Costa-Mattioli et al., eIF2alpha Phosphorylation Bidirectionally
Regulates the Switch from Short- to Long-Term Synaptic Plasticity and
Memory, 129 CELL 195 (2007); Julie M. Miwa & Andreas Walz,
Enhancement in Motor Learning through Genetic Manipulation of the
Lynx1 gene, PLOS ONE (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.plosone.org/
article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0043302.
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and problem solving by taking a drug called tolcapone, which is
prescribed for patients with Parkinson’s disease, and exogenous
medication may overcome a type of genotype-associated trait under
which genetic variation can be associated with reduced dopamine
neurotransmission to impair learning and cognitive performance. 28
Finally, a Chinese research institute located in Hong Kong has
purchased more than $90 million worth of advanced genetic
sequencing machines and is using them, among other things, to
sequence the DNA of 2000 Chinese school children to search for genes
that correlate with educational testing scores. 29 Again, recruiters and
trainers can be expected to want to use tests such as these in
recruitment, training, and assignment.
C. Gene-Based Therapeutics

Like their civilian colleagues, military physicians will develop and
employ genomic technology not only to diagnose and predict but to
prevent and treat both genomic and non-genomic diseases. A detailed
description of the prospects for gene-based preventive measures and
treatments is beyond the scope of this paper, but they include (1) the
use of techniques such as recombinant DNA to manufacture drugs; (2)
gene therapy, or the introduction or modification of endogenous or
exogenous human DNA to provide an increased ability to combat
injury or illness (for example, Jonathan Moreno cites the interest of
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in using genetic
manipulation to improve the immune system 30) or to correct or
compensate for genomic abnormalities; and (3) altering the
composition or characteristics of the microbiome, the non-human
organisms found in the human digestive system and elsewhere that
play a significant role in metabolism and human health. An especially
controversial subject is germ line therapy, which entails making
therapeutic alterations in an individual’s DNA at such an early stage
of development that the changes will be incorporated into eggs or
sperm and therefore can be inherited by the individual’s descendants.
The military may be interested in germ line therapy, for example, in
order to reduce the frequency and costs of care for heritable genomic
disorders in military families.
28.

José A. Apud et al., Tolcapone Improves Cognition and Cortical
Information
Processing
in
Normal
Human
Subjects,
32
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 1011 (2007); Kristin M. Pearson-Fuhrhop
et al., Genetic Varia- tion in the Human Brain Dopamine System
Influences Motor Learning and Its Modulation by L-Dopa,
8 PLOS
ONE
e61197
(2013),
http://www.plosone.org/article/
info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0061197.

29.

JASON Report, supra note 1, at 21.

30.

JONATHAN MORENO, UNDUE RISK: SECRET STATE EXPERIMENTS
HUMANS 291 (2001).
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D. Genomic Enhancements

The military will be intensely interested in exploiting the
association between genomics and human capabilities and
performance. In 2001, the Committee on Opportunities in
Biotechnology for Future Army Applications of the Board on Army
Science and Technology at the National Research Council called on
the Army to “lead the way in laying ground-work for the open,
disciplined use of genomic data to enhance soldiers” health and
improve their performance on the battlefield.” 31 A 2002 report by DoD
Information Assurance and Analysis Center observed that “because
genomics [sic] information offers clues to improving human
performance it could provide the Army with means of increasing
combat effectiveness.” 32 The JASON report notes that “both offensive
and defensive military operations may be impacted by the
applications of personal genomics technologies through enhancement
of the . . . readiness, and performance of military personnel.” 33
One way that genomic science can improve military effectiveness
has been mentioned earlier: using genomic testing to sort individuals
based on how they were expected to function in various military
environments. In addition, the same genomic modification techniques
described in the previous section on gene-based therapeutics could be
used to actively improve warfighting ability. For example, until
recently, one company, 23andMe, offered direct-to-consumer genetic
testing for a number of nondisease traits including avoidance of errors,
eating behavior, food preference, measures of intelligence, memory,
muscle performance, and pain sensitivity. The company acknowledged
that the ability of the tests to actually measure these traits has not
been established, but if the genomic variations could in fact be
identified, it might be possible to manipulate them directly or by
administering drugs that affected the proteins for which they coded.
Conceivably, then, warfighters could be made smarter and less errorprone, given better memories and muscles, or have their metabolisms
altered to enable them to function with fewer calories or on unusual
diets.
More fancifully, perhaps, warfighters could be genomically
reengineered to need less sleep. A study published in February 2013
and financed by the U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research
31.

NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, OPPORTUNITIES
ARMY APPLICATIONS 64 (2001).

32.

Ashley R. Melson, Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and Biotechnology in the
Military: A Comparative Analysis of Legal and Ethical Issues in the
Research, Development, and Use of Biotechnological Products on
American and British Soldiers, 14 ALB. L. J. SCI. TECH. 497, 506 n.41
(2004).

33.

JASON Report, supra note 1, at 1.

124

IN

BIOTECHNOLOGY

FOR

FUTURE

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
Issues in the Use of Genomic Technology by the U.S. Military

reported that sleep deprivation disrupted the functioning of over 700
genes. 34 In the future, these genes might be able to be reprogrammed
so that they were not as affected by sleeplessness, enabling
warfighters to carry out missions despite lack of sleep. A 2008 JASON
report predicted that, in contrast to elite sports, small improvements
in warfighter performance would not have a dramatic effect on the
outcome of military engagements; a major breakthrough in the need
for sleep, however, “could seriously alter the balance of
engagement.” 35

III. Limitations on the Use of Civilian Approaches in
the Military
The uses of genomic technology by the military described in the
previous section raise a host of ELSI issues. How should the military,
for example, conduct genomic research? What types of genomic
testing are appropriate in the military and how should the results be
used? What rules should govern how the military provides genomic
therapeutics and enhancement technologies to its personnel?
Similar questions arise in the civilian sector, and the ELSI
program at the NIH has attempted to articulate solutions. However,
the suitability of these civilian solutions in the military is limited by
differences in core values. In his landmark work Moral Issues in
Military Decision Making, Anthony Hartle articulates freedom,
equality, individualism, and democracy as the core American values.36
For the military on the other hand, Hartle identifies “honor”, “duty”,
and “country”. 37 In contrast to the civilian notion that the welfare of
the individual is paramount, in the military it is subservient to the
unit, mission, and country. In contrast to the civilian values of
freedom, equality, and democracy, members of the military are
obliged to obey lawful orders. The military also emphasizes taking
responsibility for one’s decisions and actions, and an obligation to
promote the welfare of subordinates to the extent consistent with the
welfare of the unit, the accomplishment of the mission, and the
safeguarding of the state.
In a separate paper, 38 I argue that these differences in core values
require a different set of principles to govern bioethics in the military.
34.

Id.

35.

(Mar.
JASON PROJECT, HUMAN PERFORMANCE 76
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/human.pdf.

36.

ANTHONY E. HARTLE, MORAL ISSUES
136–141, 173 (2004).

37.

Id. at 57–60.

38.

Maxwell J. Mehlman & Stephanie O. Corley, A Framework for Military
Bioethics, 13 J. MIL. ETHICS 331 (2014).
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The focus on the welfare of the individual patient in the clinical
application of the civilian principle of beneficence, which stands in
sharp contrast to the military value of selflessness, should be replaced
in the military by the principle of proportionality. According to the
principle of proportionality, a biomedical risk can be imposed on a
warfighter only when there is no less risky alternative to accomplish a
legitimate military objective, and the nature and degree of the risk are
outweighed by the military advantage sought to be gained. In view of
the lack of individual autonomy in the military, it also makes sense to
downplay the civilian emphasis on voluntary choice reflected in the
principle of “respect for persons” by substituting instead the principle
of paternalism. Combining the principles of paternalism and
proportionality, military commanders have a duty to ensure that the
biomedical risks that they impose on their subordinates are
proportionate. These twin principles also guide privacy and
confidentiality: commanders have a duty to protect their
subordinates” privacy and confidentiality unless and to the extent
that it is outweighed by military necessity. Commanders likewise have
a duty to protect warfighters” dignity by avoiding exposing them to
biomedical risks that humiliate or demean them. Finally, the principle
of fairness should replace the civilian principle of justice and require
members of the military to give their consent when commanders
impose a biomedical risk only on a subgroup of subordinates or when
the risk is especially great. Fairness also precludes using biomedical
risks as a punishment for bad behavior or imposing the risks in a
discriminatory manner or on warfighters who are less able to bear
them than others, such as physically weaker members of a unit.
Not only do basic principles of bioethics differ in civilian and
military life, but several laws that play an important role in civilian
genomics do not apply to service members, including the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) 39 and, according to the socalled Feres doctrine, the common law doctrine that provides damages
for victims of medical malpractice. 40 These legal differences must be
taken into account in analyzing the ELSI issues that arise in military
genomics.
39.

See, e.g., Genetic Discrimination, NAT’L HUM. GENETIC RES. INST.,
http://www.genome.gov/ 10002077 (last visited May 2, 2014); Kathy L.
Hudson et al., Keeping Pace with the Times—The Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2661 (2008);
Susannah Baruch & Kathy Hudson, Civilian and Military Genetics:
Nondiscrimination Policy in a Post-GINA World, 83 AM. J. HUM.
GENET. 435 (2008).

40.

See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Lanus v. U.S., 133
S. Ct. 2731 (2013); Major v. United States, 835 F.2d 641 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988); Connell v. Copeland, 417 Fed.
Appx. 3 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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The sections that follow identify the ELSI challenges raised by
military genomics explain how similar issues have been addressed by
the civilian ELSI program, and consider whether the civilian
approaches are appropriate in the military due to their different
bioethical and legal frameworks, and, if not, how these approaches
should be adjusted to meet the needs of the military in an ethically,
legally, and socially appropriate manner. The challenges can be
grouped into several broad categories. One set of concerns pertains to
military human subjects research. 41 A related set of issues involve the
military operation of DNA biobanks and geno–phenobanks and the
commercialization of research discoveries. A third series of issues
relates to clinical and enhancement uses of genomic technologies by
the military. 42

IV. Research Issues
Military research with human subjects can be conducted in three
settings. One is intramural research, where the subjects are members
of the military. The second is extramural research, where the military
sponsors research that is conducted in civilian institutions such as
hospitals and universities. 43 The third setting is research conducted by
the VA on veterans who are receiving medical care from the VA.
Each of these settings raises different ESLP issues and therefore will
be discussed separately.
A. Intramural Clinical Research

As discussed earlier, the military may wish to conduct genomic
research to obtain general information relating to human health or to
obtain information of particular relevance to the military. There are
two types of genomic research involving human subjects: clinical
research, in which experiments are conducted on live humans, and
non-clinical research, which is conducted on human biological material
such as DNA samples. (DoD calls clinical research “research involving
a human being as an experimental subject” to distinguish it from
“research involving human subjects,” which includes both clinical and

41.

Issues are also raised by experiments on non-human subjects, especially
other primates, but are beyond the scope of this paper.

42.

As noted in an earlier footnote, military genomics also potentially
involves the development of genomic weaponry, a topic that is beyond
the scope of this paper.

43.

A study also might be conducted on both military and civilian subjects,
which will not be discussed specifically because the issues that it raises
are addressed by the discussion of the separate use of these study
populations.
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non-clinical research. 44) The following discussion concerns clinical
genomic research; a discussion of non-clinical genomic research
appears in Balancing Risks and Benefits below.
1. Informed Consent

It might be thought that, under the principles of proportionality
and paternalism, clinical research can take place without the informed
consent of military subjects when the research is important enough to
the unit, mission, or nation. An argument can be made that one
major philosophical justification for informed consent, Immanuel
Kant’s deontological “categorical imperative” that individuals should
be treated as ends rather than as means, has little application in the
military. Military bioethicist Michael Gross asserts that, at least in
wartime, “human life is of but instrumental value”, and observes that
“Kant’s maxim to treat others as ends guides bioethics. But it does
not guide war. During armed conflict, there is very little compunction
about using persons as means.” 45 No doubt based in part on this
reasoning, the military gave soldiers lysergic acid diethylamide and
other hallucinogens without telling them that they were being given
the drugs 46 but instead that they were participating in a study on the
effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment against chemical
warfare agents. 47 Similarly, voluntary consent was not always obtained
from military personnel involved in radiation experiments that were
conducted as part of atomic bomb testing. 48
Despite doubts about the applicability of a Kantian perspective to
the military, at least since the trials of Nazi war criminals and the
promulgation of the Nuremberg Code, which makes no distinction
between civilian and military subjects, it is generally accepted that
competent adults must give their informed consent to serve as
subjects in biomedical research, and this consensus has long been
44.

Protection of Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical Standards in
DoD-Supported Research, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI)
No. 3216.02, Glossary at 38 (2011) [hereinafter DoDI. 3216.02], available
at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/321602p.pdf (accessed
May 2, 2014).

45.

MICHAEL GROSS, BIOETHICS AND ARMED CONFLICT: MORAL DILEMMAS OF
MEDICINE AND WAR 171–72 (2006). Gross’s emphasis on wartime
suggests that warfighters should not be regarded as means to the
military’s ends in peacetime or in non-combat operations, but the
principle of proportionality applies in all phases of military life, and
therefore individual welfare always can be sacrificed for military
necessity so long as the sacrifice is proportionate.

46.

H. R. REP. NO. 106–556, at 111, 185 (2010) [hereinafter Radiation
Report].

47.

U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671 (1987).

48.

Radiation Report, supra note 44, at 484.
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reflected in official military policy. 49 Moreover, if the risks to subjects
are more than minimal, it is required under the military bioethical
principle of fairness since only a subset of the force is likely to be
enrolled as participants. Informed consent also has practical value in
military research; failure to obtain informed consent could discourage
individuals from serving as research subjects, thereby reducing the
amount of beneficial research that can be conducted, and even could
discourage individuals from serving in the military in the first place.
A 2000 congressional report on the DoD’s mandatory anthrax vaccine
program, for example, was especially concerned about the effect of the
program on retention in reserve units, and noted that half of the air
crew in one Air National Guard unit had resigned as a result. 50
There is no reason to waive or weaken the requirement of
informed consent for biomedical research employing military personnel
as subjects when the research involves genomic science. Informed
consent is a central focus in the government’s efforts to protect
human subjects in genetic and genomic research. 51 Indeed, it has been
49.

Troops in Cuba who participated in Walter Reed’s yellow fever
experiments signed forms indicating that they understood the risk and
freely consented to be enrolled as subjects. Radiation Report, supra note
44, at 97; Arthur O. Anderson, A Brief History of Military
Contributions to Ethical Standards for Research Involving Human
Subjects, ARTNSCIENCE, http://artnscience.us/Med Ethics/index.html
(last visited May 4, 2014) [hereinafter Anderson History]. In 1953, the
Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, distributed a memorandum
throughout the military that permitted Armed Services personnel to
serve as research subjects only if they gave their voluntary consent.
Radiation Report, supra note 44, at 105; Anderson History, at 11.
Although the Wilson Memorandum was classified top secret until 1975
for reasons that are not entirely clear (see Radiation Report, supra note
44, at 107), the Army chief of staff issued a non-classified version of the
memorandum in 1954 as Army Directive CS:35 (see Radiation Report,
supra note 44, at 107) and incorporated CS:35 into Army regulations as
AR 70–25 in 1962. Radiation Report, supra note 44, at 182; Anderson
History at 11, 16. The Air Force issued the Wilson Memorandum as a
regulation in 1965, and the Navy included a requirement of voluntary
research consent in its Medical Department Manual in 1967. Radiation
Report, supra note 44, at 183. In addition, the Navy made it clear in
1969 that the requirement of voluntary consent applied both to patients
and healthy subjects, and the Army followed suit in 1973 in Army
Regulation 40–38. Radiation Report, supra note 44, at 183. In 1984,
Congress enacted legislation prohibiting DoD from conducting human
subjects research without informed consent (10 U.S.C. § 980). (As
discussed below, however, the Secretary of Defense may waive the
requirement of informed consent in certain circumstances.) DoD also has
issued Directive 3216.2, which, among other things, states that informed
consent is a requirement of DoD policy.

50.

Radiation Report, supra note 44, at 46.

51.

See, e.g., Informed Consent for Genomics Research, NAT’L HUM.
GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/27026588 (last visited May
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argued that genomic research requires even stronger protections for
subjects than many other types of human experimentation because of
the sensitive nature of personal genomic information that a study may
uncover, such as predictive data about future illnesses for which the
subject or the subject’ family members are at risk52 or misattributed
paternity and maternity, that is, the discovery that a person’s
presumed father or mother is not in fact biologically related. 53
One reason to conduct genomic research on military personnel
without informed consent might be to help preserve secrecy so that
adversaries were not alerted to the production of information that
might help them construct genomic weapons or defenses. 54 For
example, the military may feel the need to conceal the fact that it is
obtaining genomic information about members of the same
genomically differentiated subpopulation as enemy combatants. 55
National security arguments have been put forth on behalf of military
experiments conducted without consent in the past, such as atomic
radiation experiments during the Manhattan Project and the Cold
War. Although critics of those experiments argue that a measure of
voluntary consent could have been sought from subjects, for example,
by using the term “dangerous radioactive substance” in place of the
classified word “plutonium”, 56 it may not always be possible to use
obfuscating terminology and still provide sufficient information to
2, 2014); ELSI Research Priorities and Possible Research Topics, NAT’L
HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/27543732 (last
visited May 2, 2014).
52.

Protecting Human Research Subjects, National Institutes of Health
Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) 1993 Institutional
Review Board Guidebook, NAT’L HUM .GENOME RES. INST.,
http://www.genome.gov/10001752 (last visited May 2, 2014)

53.

Jean McEwen, Genetic Information, Ethics, and Information Relating to
Biological Parenthood, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND
POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 356 (Thomas H. Murray & Maxwell
J. Mehlman eds., 2000).

54.

Another reason to permit human subjects research to proceed without
informed consent is to facilitate research on emergency treatments for
patients who cannot give consent because of their condition and where
there is no time to obtain legally authorized consent from someone else,
such as a family member. Congress in 2001 enacted a provision
permitting this type of emergency research to be conducted on
warfighters. 10 USC § 980(b). In 2006, Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) adopted a regulation permitting emergency research to be
conducted outside of the military as well. 21 CFR § 50.24.

55.

Victor W. Sidel & Barry S. Levy, Physician-Soldier: A Moral Dilemma?
in 1 TEXTBOOKS OF MILITARY MEDICINE: MILITARY MEDICAL ETHICS
(Edmund D. Pelegrino, Anthony E. Hartle, Edmund G. Howe & Walter
Reed eds., 2004), at 293–312.

56.

Radiation Report, supra note 44, at 205–207.
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subjects to enable them to give informed consent. The solution would
seem to be to enroll only those subjects who held security clearances
high enough to permit them to be given the classified information.
A requirement that members of the military give their informed
consent to serve as subjects in genomic research does not mean that
they actually can do so, however. In order for individuals to give
informed consent, they first must have adequate information about
the nature, potential benefits, and risks of the experiment, and they
must be able to understand the information to a reasonable degree.57
Serious doubts have been expressed about prospective subjects”
ability to comprehend and absorb the information they are given.58
There is little reason to expect members of the military to do better
than other subjects; on average, for example, they are less well
educated than the general public. 59
Members of the military may also feel pressured to consent.
Indeed, a strong argument can be made that warfighters should be
regarded as a “vulnerable” study population, despite not being
formally listed as vulnerable in the Common Rule. 60 It was not until
1981 that Army regulations were changed to prohibit penalties under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice from being imposed on
warfighters who refused to volunteer or withdrew from participating
in military research. 61 Even without the prospect of formal
punishment, warfighters may feel that they have no choice but to
acquiesce when they are invited to serve as subjects. As Victor Sidel
and Barry Levy explain in the Textbook of Military Medicine,
“because they cannot simply “quit their jobs” “file a grievance” with a
union, government agency, or professional organization, military
personnel may not believe that they can truly refuse to participate in
these experiments. They may feel more like a “captive audience” than
like “volunteers.” 62 Moreover, as the House Committee on
Government Reform pointed out in its critique of DoD’s mandatory
anthrax vaccination program, “in a culture based on a chain of
command and the power to compel, attempts at persuasion and
education often devolve into intimidation.” 63 Superiors may make
57.

Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

58.

See James Flory & Ezekiel Emanuel, Interventions to Improve Research
Participants’ Understanding in Informed Consent for Research, 292
JAMA 1593 (2004).

59.

Efthimios Parasidis, Justice and Beneficence in Military Medicine and
Research, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 723, 765–66 (2012).

60.

Id. at 775; John McManus et al., Informed Consent and Ethical issues
in Military Medical Research, 12 ACAD. EMER. MED. 1120 (2005).

61.

Anderson, supra note 47.

62.

Sidel & Levy, supra note 53, at 297.

63.

Radiation Report, supra note 44, at 46.
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subordinates’ willingness to serve as subjects a condition for allowing
them to undertake certain attractive missions, for example, missions
to test exciting new technologies such as genomic enhancements.64
Unit cohesion and comradeship may lead warfighters to agree to be
subjects if other members of their unit already have. 65 Warfighters
may also feel that it is their patriotic duty to participate in research,66
a notion that some commentators are pushing in the civilian sector. 67
DoD is well aware of the risk that warfighters asked to give their
informed consent to serve as research subjects will feel that they have
no choice but to accede. DoD rules prohibit superiors from
“influencing” the decisions of their subordinates regarding
participation as subjects and specifically forbid superiors from being
present when informed consent is being sought. 68 Moreover, except for
a payment of $50 in return for having blood withdrawn, military
personnel on duty may not be compensated for serving as subjects. 69
Warfighter’s limited autonomy requires a shift in emphasis in
military clinical research away from the reliance on informed consent
as a primary protection for subjects in the civilian model and toward
a reliance on paternalism. Civilian research ethics contain a strong
element of paternalism; subjects are only asked to give their consent
to participate in research after experts, in the form of institutional
review boards, sponsors, government regulators, and the investigators
themselves, are satisfied that the potential benefits of a study
outweigh the risks. Given the limits on warfighter autonomy, the need
for paternalism in the military is more pronounced, however, and
ensuring proportionality must be viewed as the primary responsibility
of research directors, institutional review boards, and subjects’
commanders rather than the subjects themselves. To that end, DoD
rules require the appointment of an “ombudsman” and a “research
64.

See Jennifer Siegel, Advancing Ethical Research Practices in the
Military, 24 ABA HEALTH SECTION, THE HEALTH LAWYER 1 (2012).

65.

Id.

66.

Id.

67.

See G. Owen Schaefer, Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Alan Wertheimer, The
Obligation to Participate in Biomedical Research, 302 JAMA 67 (2009).
Warfighter’s rights are also limited by the Feres doctrine, which
prohibits warfighters from suing the military for damages for medical
malpractice, including when they have been harmed by researcher
negligence. The staff of the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs in
1994 therefore recommended that the doctrine be deemed inapplicable if
military personnel are injured in experiments in which they were forced
to serve as subjects. U.S. SENATE CMTE. ON VET. AFF., IS MILITARY
RESEARCH HAZARDOUS TO VETERANS’ HEALTH? LESSONS SPANNING HALF
A CENTURY 44 (1994).

68.

DoDI 3216.02, supra note 42, at §§ 7(e)(1)(b) and (c).

69.

Id. at § 11(a)(1)(a).

132

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
Issues in the Use of Genomic Technology by the U.S. Military

monitor” (who may be the same person) to oversee the informed
consent process when the research presents more than minimal risk
(and, in the case of an ombudsman, when the recruitment of subjects
takes place in a “group setting”). 70 Individual services have added
additional oversight in certain cases in the form of a requirement for a
second level of protocol review in addition to review by an
institutional review board (IRB). 71 One approach that the military has
taken to promote voluntary participation in research is to establish
special units from which to draw subjects, beginning with Operation
Whitecoat, in which 2,300 Seventh-Day Adventist Church
conscientious objectors between 1954 and 1973 participated in 137
protocols to develop vaccines and treatments for Q fever, tuleremia,
various viral encephalitides, Rift Valley fever virus, sand fly fever and
plague, 72 and continuing with the Medical Research Volunteer
Subjects program using the US Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) troops recruited from “Medic School
91B” at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. 73 Although concerns have been
voiced in connection with Operation Whitecoat that Seventh-Day
Adventist church officials endorsed the program, with one subject
later pointing out that “we grew up to trust the church,” 74 the head of
USAMRIID emphasizes that participation in research among
members of these units is voluntary, with only about eighty percent of
the troops consenting to serve as subjects in any one year. 75 This has
led some commentators to suggest that similar units should be the
70.

Id. at §§ 7(e)(1)(d), 8(a).

71.

The Army requires second-level review by the Human Research
Protection Office, a part of the Office of Re- search Protections, US
Army Medical Command Medical Research and Materiel Command.
U.S. Army Reg- ulation 40–38 (1989) and 70–25 (1990). The Navy
requires second-level review by the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering, for clinical studies and the Secretary of the Navy must
review research involving “severe or unusual intrusions, either physical
or psychological, on human subjects” including “consciousness- altering
drugs or mind-control techniques,” (p. 9) and research on ‘potentially or
inherently controversial topics (such as those likely to attract significant
media coverage or that might involve challenge by interest groups).’
SECNAVINST 3900.39D (2006). The Air Force Surgeon General’s
Research Oversight Commit- tee reviews protocols involving greater
than minimal risk and investigational drugs, etc. AFI40–402, § 2.2.2
(2005).

72.

Anderson, supra note 47.

73.

Id.

74.

Mark D. Somerson, Church Blessed Germ Experiments; Army’s
Biological Warfare Research Used Seventh-Day Adventist Volunteers,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 8, 2001, at 1A.

75.

Id.
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primary if not the exclusive source of military research subjects. 76 But
it is still unclear if the members of these units would feel sufficiently
free to decline to participate in research, and specialized groups of
subjects may not be representative of the troops who actually would
be exposed to the instrumentalities being tested.
2. Balancing Risks and Benefits

An axiom of research ethics is that a study may proceed only if
the risks are outweighed by the potential benefits. In balancing
research risks and benefits, civilian and military principles of bioethics
function almost identically. In both regimes, the risks to the subjects
can be outweighed either by the benefits to the subjects themselves or
by the benefits, in the form of the knowledge gained, to others.
Civilian research thus employs an approach similar to the military
principle of proportionality in which the welfare of the individual can
be subordinated to a greater good in appropriate circumstances.
Civilian research also embraces the military principle of paternalism;
as mentioned earlier, the balancing of risks and benefits is entrusted
first to institutional review boards, study sponsors, government
regulators, and the investigators themselves, and only after they have
satisfied themselves that the benefits outweigh the risks are subjects
asked to make their own assessment in giving their informed consent
to participate.
Balancing research risks and benefits in the military raises certain
questions, however. Warfighters may be subjected to grave personal
risks in order to achieve a military objective; as Bill Rhodes, president
of the International Society for Military Ethics, states, “a military
member is expected to serve the state unto maiming, capture, or
death.” 77 Accordingly, a research risk that would be deemed excessive
for civilian subjects, such as a significant likelihood of serious harm in
a study intended to produce knowledge to benefit others but with no
direct benefit to the subjects, might be deemed acceptable for military
subjects, under the principle of proportionality if the military
objectives were sufficiently important. In other words, while the risks
might be greater than for civilians, so might be the corresponding
benefits to the unit, mission, or country. 78 Along this line, military
76.

Parasidis, supra note 57, at 778.

77.

BILL RHODES, AN INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY ETHICS 50–51 (2009).

78.

Military research rules incorporate the civilian concept of ‘no more than
minimal risk’, which relaxes certain human subjects’ protections in
certain civilian studies. However, the meaning of the concept in the
military is unclear. DoD regulations use the same definition of ‘minimal
risk’ as civilian regulations (no more than those risks ‘ordinarily
encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical
or psychological examinations or tests’) (32 CFR § 219.102(i)); and DoD
Instruction 3216.02 states that ‘the phrase “ordinarily encountered in
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subjects ought to be allowed to participate in studies intended to
produce information of special relevance to the military, such as tests
of genomic interventions to treat PTSD, that posed greater risks than
studies aimed at developing genomic interventions of no special value
to the military.
Another question is how to weigh the risks and benefits of
research on genomic enhancements, such as interventions to increase
“the ability to tolerate conditions of sleep deprivation, dehydration, or
prolonged exposure to heat, cold, or high altitude” mentioned in the
JASON report. 79 Although as discussed later, the distinction between
enhancements and other types of biomedical interventions is not
always easy to make, 80 some commentators believe that enhancement
benefits are less worthwhile than medical benefits and therefore that a
risk that might be acceptable in a medical trial would be unethical in
an enhancement experiment. One bioethicist states, for example, that:
[t]he cost/benefit analysis is different for enhancement. While
those who are experimenting with treatments for serious
diseases may only succeed in substituting one kind of misery for
another, those experimenting on human enhancement are likely
to substitute a miserable life for a happy one. 81

As my colleague Jessica Berg and I have argued, however, the
value of a benefit clearly depends on the nature of the benefit; 82 an
enhancement that potentially increased cognitive function
daily life or during the performance of routine physical or physiological
examinations or tests” in the definition of minimal risk . . . shall not be
interpreted to include the inherent risks certain categories of human
subjects face in their everyday life. For example, the risks imposed in
research involving human sub- jects focused on a special population
should not be evaluated against the inherent risks encountered in their
work environment (e.g., emergency responder, pilot, soldier in a combat
zone) or having a medical condition (e.g., frequent medical tests or
constant pain)’ [DoD Instruction 3216.02, Encl. 3(6)(b)(emphasis
added)]. This language suggests that the risks of ordinary daily life for
warfighters should be deemed the same as those for civilians. On the
other hand, the DoD Instruction could be interpreted to mean that,
while ordinary daily risks for warfighters are understood to be greater
than for civilians, “minimal risk” should not be evaluated in terms of
warfighters in especially dangerous units or locations, such as combat.
Clarification of the DoD Instruction would be helpful.
79.

JASON, supra note 1, at 43.

80.

See text accompanying notes 180–182, infra.

81.

NICHOLAS AGAR, LIBERAL EUGENICS:
ENHANCEMENT 167–68 (2004).

82.

Jessica Berg & Maxwell Mehlman, Human Subjects Protections in
Biomedical Enhancement Research: Assessing Risk and Benefit and
Obtaining Informed Consent, 36 J. L. MED. ETHICS 546 (2008).
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substantially, for example, might be deemed more valuable than a
treatment, say, for nail fungus. In both health-oriented and
enhancement research, therefore, the potential benefit necessary to
justify a set of risks will depend on the specifics of the study in
question. Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish between enhancement
and other types of biomedical research in the military; a study of a
genomic intervention to provide combat troops with better-thannormal vision, hearing, or cognition, or a greater-than-normal ability
to tolerate conditions of sleep deprivation, dehydration, or prolonged
exposure to heat, cold, or high altitude, for example, could be
regarded as the study of how to prevent injury as well as an
enhancement study. In short, there is no reason to treat an
enhancement experiment differently than a treatment study when it
comes to balancing risks and benefits.
3. Return of Research Results

A particularly controversial topic in genomic research is whether
researchers have a duty to provide study findings to the subjects if
the information could provide health benefits to the subjects. The
issue arises especially when researchers are examining large amounts
of genomic information on large numbers of subjects, such as
searching a collection of DNA samples for variations associated with
particular disease risks or traits. As noted earlier, for example,
military researchers are hunting for genomic variations that
predispose warfighters to PTSD. If they discover such variations,
should they inform those subjects who have them?
The answer might seem to be “of course”, since individuals
generally have a right to receive their personal biomedical
information. But some geneticists worry that, since genomic
information is often difficult to understand, subjects may misinterpret
it and be harmed. Genomic findings often are probabilistic, and the
average person has difficulty understanding probabilities. The effect of
a genomic variation may be small; the genetic variation APOE4, for
example, is found in forty percent of persons with late-onset
Alzheimer’s disease but also in twenty-five to thirty percent of the
general population. 83 Many disease genes vary greatly in how they are
“expressed” and in their degree of “penetrance”, so that individuals
may never show symptoms or may only experience a mild form of the
illness. Since physicians may be uncertain about how to interpret
genomic test results, one suggestion is to rely on specially trained
experts called genetic counselors to convey results to subjects, but this
requires more time and adds to the cost. Another complication is that
83.

Alzheimer’s Disease Fact Sheet, NAT’L INST. ON AGING,
http://www.nia.nih.gov/alzheimers/publication/alzheimersdisease-genetics-fact-sheet (last visited May 2, 2014).

136

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
Issues in the Use of Genomic Technology by the U.S. Military

some diseases such as Alzheimer’s cannot now be prevented or
treated, and some commentators question the value of informing
subjects about risks for those kinds of disorders. 84 Furthermore, the
Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act (CLIA) requires laboratories
that test DNA to be “CLIA-certified” if the results are reported to
diagnose, prevent, or treat disease or to assess health, 85 and obtaining
and maintaining CLIA certification is burdensome and expensive.
Finally, commentators argue that researchers do not have the same
obligations to subjects that physicians have to their patients, in
particular, a duty to look after the subjects’ health needs. 86
Some of these objections do not apply in the military as much as
they do in civilian research. The military is responsible for service
members’ health, so military researchers, like other superiors, have an
obligation to look out for the well-being of their subordinates under
the principle of paternalism. Moreover, military laboratories are not
driven by the same profit motive as private civilian laboratories, and
therefore may be less burdened by having to comply with CLIA
requirements.
But military researchers still need to carefully consider the pros
and cons of returning results to subject. They should have the same
compunctions about how well subjects understand study results as
their civilian brethren, especially since they are held accountable for
the welfare of subjects under the principle of paternalism.
Furthermore, there may be special considerations that justify
withholding genomic information from military subjects. For example,
if the military eventually discovers genomic variations closely
associated with certain desirable or undesirable traits, it may decide
to test prospective enlistees and use the results in making service
assignments, but may not want to disclose the results to warfighters
because of military exigencies. Warfighters told that they were at
increased risk for certain types of battlefield injuries, for example,
they might lose effectiveness if military necessity required them to
participate in combat missions. The need for security to keep sensitive

84.

See, e.g., Sanford C. Gordon & Dimitri Landa, Disclosure of the Genetic
Risk of Alzheimer’s Disease, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 181 (2010); Rosalie
A. Kane & Robert L. Kane, Effect of Genetic Testing for Risk of
Alzheimer’s Disease, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 298 (2009).

85.

42 C.F.R. § 493 (2003).

86.

See, e.g., Ellen W. Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The Legal Risks of
Returning Results of Genomics Research, 14 GENET. MED. 473 (2012);
Pilar Ossorio, Taking Aims Seriously: Repository Research and Limits
on the Duty to Return Individual Research Findings, 14 GENET. MED.
461 (2012); Leslie A. Meltzer, Undesirable Implications of Disclosing
Individual Genetic Results to Research Participants,6 AM. J. BIOETHICS
28 (2006).
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genomic information out of the hands of adversaries also might justify
withholding test results from warfighters in certain circumstances.
Another question is whether researchers who disclose results to
patients to improve their health should also disclose the results to
family members who may also be at risk for the same genomic
conditions, and if so, should they do so only with the subjects’
permission. The question has been addressed mainly in the context of
the relationship between patients and physicians rather than subjects
and researchers, and there is a split of opinion. Many prominent
groups say that doctors may override the patient’s wishes if the
physician has made a reasonable effort to obtain the patient’s
consent, there is a high probability that imminent, serious harm will
occur if the information is not disclosed, and only information
necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of disease is disclosed. 87 (The
Institute of Medicine goes further and says that the information must
be disclosed. 88) However, some physician groups maintain that
notifying family members is the patient’s responsibility rather than
the physician’s, and point out that laws in Illinois, Massachusetts,
and New York prohibit any disclosure of genetic information without
the patient’s consent. 89 Whatever the eventual consensus, the only
reason for the rules governing disclosure of research to family
members to differ between military and civilian life would be if the
disclosure would pose a significant threat to national security or the
successful completion of a military mission.
87.

See, e.g., U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS: A REPORT ON
THE ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC SCREENING,
COUNSELING, AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS (1983); B.M. Knoppers et al.,
ASHG Statement: Professional Disclosure of Familial Genetic
Information, 62 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 474 (1998), available at
http://www.ashg.org/pdf/pol-29%20.pdf (accessed May 5, 2014); Ruth
Macklin, Privacy Control of Genetic Information, in GENE MAPPING:
USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 157–72, (George J. Annas & Sherman
Elias eds., 1992); Kenneth Offit et al., The “Duty to Warn” a Patient’s
Family Members About Hereditary Disease Risks, 292 JAMA 1469
(2004); Dorothy C. Wertz, John C. Fletcher & Kare Berg, Review of
Ethical Issues in Medical Genetics, WORLD HEALTH ORG. HUM.
GENETICS PROGRAMME (2003), http://www.who.int/ genomics/
publications/en/ethicalissuesinmedgenetics%20report.pdf (last visited
May 5, 2014).

88.

INST. MED., ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS
SOCIAL POLICY (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994).

89.

See, e.g., Mark E. Robson et al., American Society of Clinical Oncology
Policy Statement Update: Genetic Testing for Cancer Susceptibility, 21
J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2397 (2003); Am. Med. Ass’n, Proceedings of the
2013 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, Reports of the Council
on Science and Public Health (Nov. 17, 2013), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/assets/meeting/2013a/a13-csaph-reports.pdf.
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4. Incidental and Unintended Findings

A topic that is closely related to the return of research results is
how researchers should handle information about subjects that is
outside of the scope of the study, called “incidental” or “unintended”
findings. 90 (A similar issue arises when a physician examining a
patient’s genome for certain clinically relevant information discovers
other medically relevant findings. 91) Researchers searching for genomic
mutations that made subjects susceptible to PTSD, for example,
inadvertently might discover mutations that placed certain subjects at
risk for other diseases. The question is whether the researchers should
disclose the incidental information. Again, the answer might seem
clear that they should, since doing so could alert subjects to the need
for future vigilance and beneficial medical care. But this raises
concerns similar to those raised by returning results in general. Is the
medical risk reflected by the incidental information sufficiently
important to outweigh the chance that subjects will misunderstand it?
How clear is it that the individual will show symptoms of the genomic
disease or will experience a serious form of the illness? What if little
or nothing can be done to reduce or eliminate the health risk? One
particularly troublesome type of unintended finding, which can occur
when both parents and offspring are studied in “pedigree” research, is
that a parent is not biologically related to a child; how should
researchers handle this result, which can be extremely disruptive to
the family unit?
For these reasons, some commentators maintain that researchers
have no obligation to inform subjects about incidental findings. 92 A
growing consensus seems to be emerging, however, that researchers
should disclose incidental findings that are sufficiently important for
the subjects’ health, or at least that subjects should be asked during
the informed consent process if they wish to receive this information.93
90.

See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES,
ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE: ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF INCIDENTAL
AND SECONDARY FINDINGS IN THE CLINICAL, RESEARCH, AND DIRECT-TO(2013),
http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/
CONSUMER CONTEXTS
files/FINALAnticipateCommunicate PCSBI0.pdf.

91.

See, eg, Robert C. Green et al., American College of Medical Genetics
and Genomics Recommendations for Report-ing of Incidental Findings
in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENET. MED. 565 (2013).

92.

Joanna S. Forsberg, Mats G. Hansson & Stefan Eriksson, Changing
Perspectives in Biobank Research: From Individual Rights to Concerns
About Public Health Regarding the Return of Results, 17 EUR. J. HUM.
GENET. 1544 (2009).

93.

See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf, The Past, Present, and Future of the Debate
over Return of Research Results and Incidental Findings, 14 (4)
Genetics in Med. 355 (2012); James P. Evans & Barbra B. Rothschild,
Return of Results: Not That Complicated? 14 (4) Genetics in Med. 358
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There is no reason to assume that military researchers have a lesser
obligation regarding disclosure of incidental findings than civilian
researchers. In fact, an argument can be made that military
researchers have a greater obligation than their civilian counterparts
to consider returning incidental findings to subjects because military
personnel have less ability than civilians to obtain genomic testing
outside of the military.
5. Follow-Up with Subjects

Another research controversy concerns whether researchers have a
duty to contact subjects after a study is over to ascertain whether
they are suffering any long-term or latent adverse effects, and to alert
them to new information bearing on their health, such as the
discovery of genomic risks that were not known at the time of the
study or the availability of new treatments or preventive measures.
The military has been criticized, for example, for not adequately
following up with subjects in the “man-break” experiments on
mustard gas during World War II. 94 Civilian researchers object that
they should not have a long-term obligation to follow up with subjects
because of the difficulties of keeping track of their whereabouts, but
military researchers should be better able to keep track of military
subjects, who may still be in the military or receiving care from the
VA. In addition, the Army maintains a Volunteer Registry for all
subjects in more-thanminimal-risk studies, one of the purposes of
which is to enable the military to “exercise its obligation to ensure
research volunteers are adequately warned of new risks and to provide
new information as it becomes available,” 95 and the US Army Medical
Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC) stores the
information for a minimum of 75 years. In sum, the military should

(2012); Susan M. Wolf et al, Managing In- cidental Findings and
Research Results in Genomic Research Involving Biobanks and Archived
Data Sets, 14 (4) Genetics in Med. 361 (2012); Isaac S. Kohane et al,
Taxonomizing, Sizing, and Overcoming the In- cidentalome, 14 (4)
Genetics in Med. 399 (2012); Robert C. Green et al, Exploring
Concordance and Dis- cordance for Return of Incidental Findings from
Clinical Sequencing, 14 (4) Genetics in Med. 405 (2012); Michael
Ferriere and Brian Van Ness, Return of Individual Research Results and
Incidental Findings in the Clinical Trials Cooperative Group Setting, 14
(4) Genetics in Med. 411 (2012).
94.

Radiation Report, supra note 44; INST. MED., VETERANS AT RISK: THE
HEALTH EFFECTS OF MUSTARD GAS AND LEWISITE 50–52 at Summary
(Constance M. Pechura & David P. Rall eds., 1993).

95.

U.S. Army, Guidelines for Investigators: Requirements for U.S. Army
Medical Research and Materiel Com- mand (USAMRMC) Headquarters
Review and Approval of Research Involving Human Volunteers, Human
Anatomical Substances, and/or Human Data, § III(G)(2).
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endeavor to contact subjects
significance to their health.

about

future

developments
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6. Paying for Participation in Research

Bioethicists are concerned that offering people substantial
amounts of money or other items of economic value in return for
serving as research subjects could compromise the voluntariness of
informed consent, 96 but this is less of a concern in the military because
DoD rules forbid paying research subjects on active duty except for
drawing a blood sample, for which they may receive $50.97 (Off-duty
personnel may receive compensation comparable to civilian subjects, 98
which under Health and Human Services (HHS) rules must be
approved by an IRB and be a reasonable amount in accordance with
prevailing local rates. 99) Military IRBs must be on guard however
against offering troops non-monetary benefits for enrolling in research
studies, such as desirable assignments or commendations. DoD rules
prohibit superiors “from influencing the decisions of their subordinates
. . . regarding participation as subjects”, 100 but the rules could be more
specific by defining what counts as “influence”. Moreover, the
prohibition against paying military subjects emphasizes the need to
protect them from being exploited by being pressured to participate in
disproportionately risky research.
Another financial issue that arises in civilian biomedical research
is whether subjects are entitled to a portion of the financial benefits
that accrue to sponsors of studies that lead to the commercialization
of a lucrative new medical product. Although withholding
compensation has been criticized as unfair, there is a general
consensus that sponsors can avoid compensating subjects if they
disclose their policy to subjects during the informed consent process. 101
96.

Neal Dickert & Christine Grady, Incentives for Research Participation,
in THE OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS c. 36 (Ezekiel
J. Emanuel et al. eds., 2008).

97.

DoDI. 3216.02, supra note 42, at § 11(a)(1).

98.

Id. at § 11(a)(2).

99.

When Does Compensating Subjects Undermine Informed Con- sent or
Parental Permission?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://answers.hhs.gov/ohrp/questions/7251 (last visited May 5, 2014).

100. DoDI. 3216.02, supra note 42, at§ 7(e)(1)(b).
101. See, e.g., William J. Curran & S. M. Hyg, Scientific and Commercial
Development of Human Cell Lines—Issues of Property, Ethics, and
Conflict of Interest, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 998 (1991); Charlotte H.
Harrison, Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for
Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 AM. J. L. MED. 77, 80
(2002); Russell Korobkin, “No Compensation” or “Pro Compensation”:
Moore v. Regents and Default Rules for Human Tissue Donations, 40 J.
HEALTH L. 1, 23 (2007); Natalie Ram, Assigning Rights and Protecting
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The argument for rewarding military subjects is weakened by their
obligation to serve the national interest, but the issue is complicated
by the fact that a substantial amount of the fruits of military research
often redounds to the benefit of private enterprises that commercialize
the resulting discoveries, including prostheses 102 and thermal imaging
devices. 103 A solution might be for DoD to ensure that genomic
discoveries with important medical value derived from research on
military subjects were available to current and former members of the
military through military medical services and the VA.
7. Compensating Subjects for Experimental Injury

The Common Rule governing human subjects research does not
require researchers to compensate civilian subjects for injuries
sustained as a result of their participation, 104 but subjects who have
been injured by negligent investigators may recover monetary
damages in a tort action. For example, the father of an 18-year-old
subject who died in a University of Pennsylvania experiment aimed at
developing a gene therapy for a genetic disease called ornithine
transcarbamylase sued the investigators for negligently enrolling his
son without proper safety testing. (The case was eventually settled for
an undisclosed sum. 105) No such remedy is available to military
subjects, however, as a result of the so-called Feres doctrine. 106 DoD
rules require researchers “to establish procedures to protect human
Interests: Constructing Ethical and Efficient Legal Rights in Human
Tissue Research, 23 HARV. J. L. TECH. 119, 121 (2009).
102. Troops’ New Bionic Leg Now for Civilians, Too, CBS NEWS (Jun. 16,
2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/troops-new-bionic-leg-now-forcivilians-too/.
103. See, e.g., Tom A. Peter, Military Inventions Hit the Civilian Market,
SCI.
MONITOR
(Jun.
19,
2008),
http://
www.
CHRIST.
csmonitor.com/Innovation/Tech-Culture/2008/0619/built-for-battlebut-perfect-in- peacetime; Josh Kulla, FLIR Introduces Products for the
(Jan. 22,
2014),
Civilian
Market,
PAMPLIN MEDIA GRP.
http://www.pamplinmedia.com/wsp/139-business/
207955-63820-flirintroduces-products-for-the-civilian-market; Matthew Peach, IR Imaging
Market Shifting from Military to Civilian, OPTICS.ORG (Sept. 13, 2013),
http://optics.org/news/4/9/16.
104. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFC. FOR HUM. RES. PROT.,
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK, c. 3 (1993), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb chapter3.htm.
105. Mary R. Anderlik & Nanette Elster, Currents in Contemporary Ethics,
29 J. L. MED. ETHICS 220 (2001); Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors:
Tricky Business When it Comes to Clinical Research, 81 B.U. L. REV.
423, 426 (2001); Robin F. Wilson, The Death of Jesse Gelsinger: New
Evidence of the Influence of Money and Prestige in Human Research, 36
AM. J. L. MED. 295 (2010).
106. Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146 (1981).
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subjects from medical expenses (not otherwise reimbursed)” that
directly result from participation in more-than-minimal-risk military
research, whereas civilian subjects may receive compensation for losses
such as pain and suffering and reduced future earnings. 107
The application of the Feres doctrine in military research has
been criticized. 108 It also runs counter to the principle of paternalism
insofar as it shields the military from having to fully redress
superiors” mistakes. But Congress has not seen fit to modify the
doctrine to permit injured subjects to receive compensation, the
courts have consistently given the doctrine a broad interpretation on
the premise that immunity from suit is essential to maintain military
discipline, and even some of the critics only want soldiers to be able
to sue for intentional rather than merely negligent research
misconduct. 109
8. Privacy and Confidentiality

Protecting the privacy and the confidentiality of subjects”
personal health information has long been a priority in civilian
research, and its importance has been reinforced by the adoption of
the privacy and security provisions of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and its accompanying
regulations. One of the requirements of informed consent under the
Common Rule, for example, is giving potential subjects “a statement
describing the extent, if any, to which confidentiality of records
identifying the subject will be maintained,” 110 and the government
recently has proposed strengthening data security and information
protection requirements for federally sponsored research. 111 In
addition, the GINA specifies that genetic information is protected
under HIPAA. 112
As noted earlier, DoD has adopted the Common Rule/It also has
subjected itself to HIPAA. 113 However, the privacy and confidentiality
107. DoDI. 3216.02, supra note 42, at § 10(b).
108. Parasidis, supra note 57, at 790–91; Siegel, supra note 62, at 4; Jaffee v.
U.S., 663 F.2d 1226, 1249–1250 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
109. Parasidis, supra note 57, at 791.
110. 42 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(5).
111. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,525 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 164 and 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56) (hereinafter HHS,
ANPRM).
112. 42 USC § 1320d–9.
113. 42 USC § 1171(5)(I), (J) (HIPAA), U.S. Department of Defense, Reg.
6025.18-R, DoD Health Information Privacy Regulation (2003)
(hereinafter DODR 6025.18-R).
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of members of the military is subordinate to military necessity.
Michael Gross observes, for example, that “among one’s own soldiers,
the scope of the private sphere decreases and that of the public
expands as collective welfare takes precedence over an individual’s
private good.” 114 DoD rules accordingly permit commanders to obtain
health information “to assure the proper execution of the military
mission”, 115 and while service members have the right to an
accounting of disclosures, there is no such right for disclosures for
national security or intelligence purposes. 116
One of the chief reasons for protecting privacy and confidentiality
in regard to genomic information is to prevent stigma and
discrimination. The legal protections against workplace discrimination
for civilian federal employees in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
GINA do not apply to uniformed members of the military. 117 Once
warfighters leave the military, however, they come under GINA’s
protections against employment discrimination on the basis of
genomic information. Furthermore, DoD policies implementing the
National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 changed a previous policy
that had denied health and disability benefits to service members who
experienced injuries or illnesses during their time of service if the
condition was “congenital or hereditary.” 118 Now, service members are
entitled to compensation and benefits so long as they do not have a
disability that was noted at the time of enlistment, unless there is
“compelling evidence or medical judgment” that the disability existed
prior to enlistment. 119 However, United States Army Special
Operations Command (USASOC) found that the two strongest fears
among service members with respect to behavioral health treatment,
including PTSD, were confidentiality, fear of being labeled, and
negative impact on career. 120 As shown in Part I.B., the most recent
114. Gross, supra note 43, at 121.
115. DODR 6025.18-R, supra note 111, at § C7.11.1.1.
116. DODR 6025.18-R, supra note 111, at § C13.1.1.5.
117. Rehabilitation Act/GINA: Confidentiality of Medi- cal/Genetic
Information, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPP. COMM’N (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2012/ginaconfidentialityofmedica
lgeneticinformation2.html; Susannah Baruch & Kathy Hudson, Civilian
and Military Genetics: Nondiscrimination Policy in a Post-GINA
World, 83 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 435 (2008). It is not clear, however, at
what point enlistees lose the protection of GINA.
118. Disability Evaluation System, DoD Directive 1332.38 (Aug. 5, 2014), §
E.3.P.4.5.2.2.
119. Hereditary and/or
E3.P4.5.2.2 (2008).
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120. Lt. Col. Paul Dean& Lt. Col. Jeffrey McNeil, Breaking the Stigma of
Behavioral Healthcare, 25 SPECIAL WARFARE 6 (2012).
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research has shown a genetic contribution to PTSD and some scholars
have raised concerns regarding “the display of pertinent genetic
information . . . may also generate stigma and affect individual career
outcomes.” 121
How should the status of subjects as members of the military
affect the privacy and confidentiality of identifiable genomic
information obtained in the course of military human subjects
research? One approach might be that, given the reduced privacy and
confidentiality within the military, the military should be able to use
identifiable genomic information obtained in the course of conducting
human subjects research on military subjects without the subjects”
informed consent, so long as the information is used for a legitimate
military purpose. But this approach conflicts with the spirit of the
military’s policy of requiring military subjects to give their informed
consent to serve as research subjects. Another approach would be for
IRBs to give the potential loss of privacy and confidentiality less
weight when balancing risks and benefits in research on military
subjects than in research on civilians. But the federal government is
contemplating removing privacy and confidentiality concerns
altogether as matters for IRB review and instead imposing mandatory
data security rules on all human subjects research. 122 The best
approach therefore is to rely on the principles of proportionality and
paternalism described earlier and place the responsibility on
commanders, including those overseeing research programs and the
researchers themselves, to protect subordinates against inappropriate
disclosures of identifiable genomic information.
In summary, using members of the military as subjects raises
many of the same ethical issues as employing civilian subjects, but
there are several notable differences. Due to limitations on warfighter
autonomy, members of the military need special protection from
coercion and undue influence during the informed consent process,
and the principles of proportionality and paternalism require
commanders to assure themselves that the potential benefits of the
study outweigh the risks rather than relying on individual subjects to
make this judgement for themselves in uncertain cases. At the same
time, risks that would be excessive for civilian subjects might be
acceptable in the military if the military’s need for the research were
sufficiently compelling. Finally, the fact that the military is
responsible for the health of its members and the relative ease with
which it can keep track of warfighters, including after they are
discharged, argue in favor of imposing a clearer obligation on military
121. Megan Allyse, Lauren C. Milner & Mildred K. Cho, Ethics Watch: The
G.I. Genome: Ethical Implications of Genome Sequencing in the
Military, 12 NATURE REV. GENET. 589 (2011).
122. HHS, ANPRM, supra note 109.
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researchers than on civilian researchers to follow up with subjects and
to return results and incidental and unintended findings to them in
appropriate cases.
B. Extramural Clinical Research

DoD spends approximately seventy-five percent of its outlay for
research and development on extramural research, that is, research
conducted at civilian institutions. 123 The allocation of such a large
portion of the defense R&D budget to civilian researchers results from
the need to fund industrial contractors that develop weapon systems
and the desire to nourish a broad science base at U.S. academic
institutions. Some of this DoD sponsored research—there are no
published estimates of how much–involves the use of live human
subjects. Some of these studies may involve genomic science, and the
amount of genomic human subjects research can be expected to
increase if DoD follows the recommendations in the JASON report
described earlier.
Extramural studies of human subjects must be approved by IRBs
at the civilian institutions conducting the research as well as by
internal military IRBs. The Army requires an additional layer of
protocol review by the USAMRMC Commanding General’s Human
Subjects Research Review Board for studies involving “gene
transfer”. 124
Although commentators have noted the potential for conflict
between internal military and external civilian IRBs, 125 there is no
information on how they interact, for example, how they resolve
disagreements. Nor is there an understanding of how the members of
civilian IRBs decide whether to approve protocols for military
sponsored research. They may not be clear on how to weigh risks to
subjects against military necessity and national security. On the one
hand, they may feel that it is inappropriate for them to reject military
studies that pose risks to subjects that would be unacceptable in
purely civilian research. On the other hand, some IRB members may
be critical of military research for various reasons, leading them to
block or unreasonably delay studies that should go forward. In
addition, both DoD and HHS regulations forbid IRBs from
123. AM. ASS’N FOR ADV’T SCI., AAAS REPORT XXXVII: RESEARCH
DEVELOPMENT FY 2013, c. 5, p. 61 (2013).
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124. U.S. Army Medical Department Medical Research and Materiel
Command, Guidelines for Investigators: Requirements for U.S. Army
Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC) Headquarters
Review and Approval of Research Involving Human Volunteers, Human
Anatomical Substances, and/or Human Data, § IV(A) (2007).
125. Paul J. Amoroso & Lynn L. Wenger, The Human Volunteer in Military
Biomedical Research, in II MILITARY MEDICAL ETHICS 563–660 (Thomas
E. Beam and Linette R. Sparacino eds., 2003).
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considering “possible long-range effects of applying knowledge gained
in the research (for example, the possible effects of the research on
public policy) as among those research risks that fall within the
purview of its responsibility,” 126 and IRBs may not know how this
restriction should affect their consideration of the long-range effects of
military research.
A special set of problems arises with classified extramural military
research. Bioethicist Jonathan Moreno notes the difficulties raised by
conducting classified military research outside of the military,
including requiring IRB members and potential subjects to have
security clearances. 127 (DoD rules, for example, require IRBs to
determine if potential subjects “need access to classified information
to make a valid, informed consent decision.” 128) The Advisory
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments evaluated human
subjects protections in classified government research and identified a
number of shortcomings in written informed consent forms.129
Academics describe resistance among academics and universities to
conducting classified government research due to concerns about
infringement of academic freedoms, including the freedom to publish
research results. 130 Nineteen of thirty-nine universities she studied had
policies prohibiting either classified or non-publishable research.
(Eisenberg notes, however, that in some cases faculty researchers at
these institutions may be affiliated with off-campus laboratories that
do not have similar restrictions.) In addition, Eisenberg reports that a
number of other universities do not consider classified research for
purposes of promotion, tenure, or academic credit.
DoD has adopted special protections for subjects in classified
experiments regardless of whether the subjects are military personnel
or civilians: the protocol must be approved by the Secretary of
Defense; the fact that the study is sponsored by DoD and that the
research is classified must be disclosed as part of the informed consent
process, unless the Secretary of Defense makes an exception because
“providing this information could compromise intelligence sources or
126. 32 CFR § 219.11(a)(2); 45 CFR § 46.111(a)(2).
127. Jonathan D. Moreno, Bioethics and the National Security State, 32 J. L.
MED. ETHICS 198 (2004).
128. DoDI 3216.02, supra note 42, at § 13(d)(4) (2011).
129. Nancy E. Kass & Jeremy Sugarman, Are Research Subjects Adequately
Protected? A Review and Discussion of Studies Conducted by the
Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments,6 KENNEDY
INST. ETHICS J. 271 (1996).
130. Maxwell Gregg Bloche, Review Essay: Rogue Science: Science in the
Service of Human Rights. By Richard Pierre Claude, 91 GEO. L. J. 1257,
1274 (2003); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Research and Academic
Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1988).
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methods;” IRBs must do a full rather than “expedited” review; and an
IRB member who disagrees with a majority decision approving the
study may appeal to the Secretary. 131 132,
The foregoing concerns about extramural military research raise
the question of whether and in what circumstances it should take
place at all. An argument can be made that all military human
subjects research, including genomic research, should take place
intramurally using members of the military as subjects. By being in
the military, they have agreed to subordinate their interests to those
of the military, and therefore seem more appropriate to bear research
risks than civilians, especially in experiments that offer no prospect of
direct benefit to subjects. Furthermore, military subjects are
protected by the principle of paternalism and therefore, at least in
theory, commanders who expose them to disproportionate
experimental risks are accountable and subject to punishment. In
civilian bioethics, on the other hand, there is a dispute over how
much of a duty civilian researchers owe to protect the interests of
their subjects, with some commentators asserting that the
investigators” duty to subjects is superseded by their duty to the
study sponsor. 133 On the other hand, certain types of genomic studies
may be more difficult to conduct in a military environment. For
example, genome-wide association studies may need to use large
civilian DNA repositories in order to have the power to discover
variations that account in small ways for phenotypes of military
interest. Moreover, the importance of maintaining the quality of U.S.
science argues in favor of continuing to use military research funding
to support civilian research institutions. Finally, requiring military
research to be conducted on military personnel could lead to public
perceptions that they were being used as human guinea pigs,
especially if the research was not on a topic primarily of military
interest.
C. VA Clinical Research

The VA has already staked a claim to genomic research by
launching its Million Veteran Program in May, 2011, which collects
voluntary donations of DNA from veterans along with permission to
correlate their genetic data with information in their medical and

131. DoDI 3216.02, supra note 42, at § 13.
132. In addition, in classified extramural research, at least one member of the
IRB must be a non-federal employee. DoDI 3216.02, supra note 42, at §
13 (d)(2).
133. See, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and
Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts on a Learning Curve, 4 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. POL’Y 1, 41–46 (2003).
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personnel records in order to establish a geno–phenobank. 134 (The
program is described further below in the section on biobanks.) In
addition, the VA conducts genomic research on amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, and PTSD. 135 In 2006, it
established a Genomic Medicine Program Advisory Committee to
guide the start of a new Genomic Medicine Program, and it also
conducts pharmacogenomic research. 136 (All VA research is
intramural. 137)
The VA, like DoD, has adopted the Common Rule to govern live
human subjects research. 138 However, VA patients asked to participate
as subjects, like other civilian patients, may fear that they will be
denied health care if they refuse. VA researchers are required to make
“every reasonable effort” to provide patients with an informational
brochure called “Volunteering in Research—Here Are Some Things
You Need To Know” which states that they have a right to say “no”
and that refusing to participate “will not affect your VA health care
or benefits.” 139 Beyond that, the agency has no special human
subjects” protections. For example, it does not recognize veterans as a
vulnerable research population. While it is true that they are not
among the groups formally designated as vulnerable subjects, they
resemble those groups in their dependence on government-provided
health care, and the fact that they served in the military may make
them feel that they have a duty to participate in research whenever
they are asked. These considerations require the VA to employ a
heightened degree of paternalism to protect veterans against
disproportionate research risks.
134. Joel Kupersmith, The Million Veterans Program: Building VA’s MegaDatabase for Genomic Medicine, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 19, 2012),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/11/19/the-million-veteran-programbuilding-vas-mega- database-for-genomic-medicine/print/.
135. Genomics, U.S. DEP’T VETS. AFF., OFC. RES. & DEV.,
http://www.research.va.gov/researchtopics/genomics.cfm#.Ud8Nhqz7Y
hg (last visited May 5, 2014).
136. Ronald Przygodski, Genomic Medicine Program, VETS. HEALTH ADMIN.
OFC.
RES.
&
DEV.,
http://www.cdc.gov/
genomics/
translation/GAPPNet/ meeting/file/print/slides/Przygodzki.pdf (last
visited May 5, 2014).
137. Veterans Health Administration Research and Development Program,
U.S. DEP’T VETS. AFF., VETS. HEALTH ADMIN. (Jul. 9, 2009),
http://www.va.gov/vhapublications/ViewPublication.asp?pub ID=2043.
138. 38 CFR § 16.101 ff.
139. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Research and
Development, Volunteering in Research—Here Are Some Things You
Need To Know, U.S. DEP’T VETS. AFF. OFC. RES. & DEV.,
http://www.research.va.gov/programs/pride/veterans/trifold.pdf
(last
visited May 5, 2014).
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D. Geno-Phenobanks

While the foregoing sections discuss the ethical, legal, and policy
issues raised by clinical genomic research using human subjects, this
section discusses another type of genomic research that uses DNA
samples rather than living human subjects.
As noted earlier, the military currently possesses millions of DNA
samples from current and former service members, and the Army, Air
Force, and VA are collecting additional samples for research purposes.
The resulting biorepositories can be linked to the medical and
personnel records of the individuals who contribute the DNA to create
geno–phenobanks, enabling researchers to discover links between DNA
variants and physical and mental conditions and characteristics.
Geno–phenobank research raises many of the same types of
ethical, legal, and policy concerns as clinical research, including the
need to obtain consent from DNA contributors to use their DNA for
research, return of results and incidental findings, shared benefit, and
maintaining the privacy and confidentiality of research results. In
regard to consent, some commentators have suggested that, based on
traditional research ethics, individuals whose DNA is proposed to be
used for research should be re-contacted and asked to give consent for
each new research project. 140 Other commentators propose that, at the
time that their DNA is obtained, individuals should give “multilayered” consent which would enable them to specify their wishes on a
detailed form, such as giving consent to future research on specific
diseases or being re-contacted and asked to consent to any future
research. 141 However, under increasing recognition that recontacting
participants to obtain their specific informed consent for every future
research project may be impractical, expensive, and possibly impede
socially valuable research, 142 there has been a growing movement away
from the model of specific informed consent. Alternatives that have
been put forward include (1) permitting human research ethics
committees to waive individual consent under circumstances where
obtaining consent is impracticable and there is a strong public interest
in the research; 143 (2) “broad” consent that allows samples to be used
for one or more general purposes, such as biomedical research in
140. See, e.g., Bernice S. Elger & Arthur L. Caplan, Consent and
Anonymization in Research Involving Biobanks: Differing Terms and
Norms Present Serious Barriers to an International Framework,7 EMBO
REPS. 661 (2006); Margaret F. A. Otlowski, Tackling Legal Challenges
Posed
by
Population
Biobanks:
Reconceptualizing
Consent
Requirements, 20 MED. L. REV. 191 (2012).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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general, or research on one or more specific diseases 144; and (3)
“blanket” consent that allows for unrestricted use of samples. 145
To understand the issues involving consent, it is important to
distinguish between research on existing DNA samples and research
on newly acquired samples. Suppose DoD wanted to combine existing
DNA samples in the AFRSSIR with digitalized medical and personnel
records of service members in order to conduct biomedical research.
Would DoD have to obtain the consent of the DNA contributors, and
if so, what kind of consent?
On the one hand, it might be argued that consent is unnecessary.
The DoD policy that requires informed consent from military research
subjects only applies to “research involving a human being as an
experimental subject,” which DoD defines as involving “an
intervention or interaction with a living individual,” 146 and therefore
the policy does not apply to research on ex vivo DNA samples.
Moreover, providing DNA to the AFRSSIR is mandatory; warfighters
have been court-martialed for refusing, 147 and their courts-martial
have been upheld by the courts. 148 Furthermore, having to obtain
consent could be burdensome in the case of individuals who are no
longer in the service, who might be difficult to locate. The argument
for proceeding without consent is especially strong in regard to
research with distinct military applications, for example, on gene
variants associated with coolness under fire, or genomic therapies that
speed trauma recovery.
On the other hand, the consensus in the civilian sector is that
research on DNA samples requires the consent of the contributors if
their identity is revealed or can be determined from the data, which,
as mentioned earlier, would be the case with a military geno–
phenobank. 149 Furthermore, the mandatory nature of the AFRRSSIR
144. Otlowski, supra note 138, at 225.
145. Mats G. Hansson et al., Should Donors Be Allowed to Give Broad
Consent to Future Biobank Research,7 LANCET ONCOLOGY 266 (2006).
146. DoDI. 3216.02, supra note 42, at Glossary.
147. LORI ANDREWS & DOROTHY NELKIN, BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET
HUMAN TISSUE IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE 113–114 (2001).

FOR

148. Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp. 300 (D. Haw. 1995), vacated as moot,
109 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1997).
149. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is proposing to
revise the rules for civilian research to require consent for any research
with human DNA or with biospecimens from which DNA may be
extracted, even if the researchers attempt to ‘de-identify’ their data.
HHS, ANPRM, supra note 109. Moreover, there is a considerable doubt
about whether genomic data can ever truly be de-identified. See, e.g.,
Jean E. McEwen, Joy T. Boyer & Kathie Y. Sun, Evolving Approaches
to the Ethical Management of Genomic Data, 29 TRENDS IN GENET. 375
(2013) (“[B]ecause of its comprehensiveness, genomic information, even
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program has been criticized, 150 and in any event, DoD currently
permits AFRRSSIR samples to be used for purposes other than
identification of remains only with the consent of the donor or the
surviving primary next-of-kin. 151 Finally, the whereabouts of personnel
who have left the service may not be that difficult to determine since
they may be obtaining health care from the Veterans Administration.
If the consent of warfighters to use existing DNA samples is
necessary, what kind of consent must be obtained? Specifically, can
warfighters be asked to consent to any research use of their DNA
(referred to as “broad” or “general” consent), or must they give
specific consent for each particular research project, including for
different projects undertaken in the future? This is the subject of
controversy in the civilian sector, but there appears to be a growing
consensus, reinforced by changes in consent rules proposed by
DHHS, 152 that broad consent is acceptable, and the reasoning
supporting the consensus suggests that broad consent also should be
sufficient for military research.
If the military must obtain consent for research using existing
DNA, all the more reason that it should obtain consent for research
on newly acquired specimens, since this can be done easily when the
specimen is obtained. Again, the consent could be broad. Indeed, this
is the approach followed by current military genomic research
projects. 153 Additional issues arise in connection with the use of DNA
when stripped of traditional identifiers, has, at least in some sense, the
potential to re-identify the individual from whom it was obtained.”).
150. Steven C. Hendricks, A Fourth Amendment Privacy Analysis of the
Department of Defense’s DNA Repository for the Identification of
Human Remains: The Law of Fingerprints Can Show Us the Way, 181
MIL. L. REV. 69 (2004); Patricia A. Ham, Army of Suspects: The History
and Constitutionality of the U.S. Military’s DNA Repository and Its
Access for Law Enforcement Purposes, 2003 ARMY L. 1 (2003); Kelly S.
Erbes, Identification of the Unknown Soldier and the Fight for the Right
to Anonymity: The Human Genome Project and Implications of a
National DNA Database, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 443 (1999); Elizabeth
Reiter, The Department of Defense DNA Repository: Practical Analysis
of the Government’s Interest and the Potential for Genetic
Discrimination, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 975 (1999); Sarah Gill, The Military’s
DNA Registry: An Analysis of Current Law and a Proposal for
Safeguards, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 175 (1997); Robert Craig Scherer,
Mandatory Genetic Dogtags and the Fourth Amendment: The Need for
a New Post-Skinner Test, 85 GEO. L. J. 2007 (1997).
151. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Operations, DoD Instruction
5154.30, § E2.5.4.4 (Mar. 18, 2003) at E2.5.
152. HHS, ANPRM, supra note 109.
153. ARMY STARRS, http://www.armystarrs.org (last visited May 5, 2014);
Informed Consent Session—U.S. Air Force Medical Service PC2-Z
Study, CORIELL PERSONALIZED MED. COLLAB., http://www.cpmc.
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samples from deceased individuals. The Common Rule that governs
civilian research does not apply to deceased persons, who are not
deemed to be “human subjects.” 154 However, some commentators have
argued that researchers should honor preferences that a deceased
person made known while alive, 155 and that consent should be
obtained from the next-of-kin. 156 In the case of the military, when they
submit samples to AFRSSIR, enlistees could be asked to give their
consent to posthumous research using their DNA.
As noted earlier, the VA operates the Million Veteran Program, a
geno–phenobank that collects DNA and health information from
veterans and combines it with their VA medical records for research
purposes. Veterans at participating VA medical centers are sent a
letter asking if they would like to participate. If they opt in, they fill
out a brief health survey and make an appointment at the medical
center to accompany their next medical visit. 157 During this visit, they
are counseled about the program, given the opportunity to consent to
be placed in the database and to make their medical records available
for research, and asked to give a blood sample. The consent is broad,
as the veteran is asked to consent to a general program of genetic
research, and the sample is kept indefinitely. As of October, 2012,
over 100,000 veterans had enrolled.158 As noted earlier, the VA does
not return any results to the donors, claiming that it is barred from
doing so because the DNA is not analyzed at a CLIA-certified
laboratory. Given the public nature of VA funding and the relative
ease in locating participating veterans, an argument can be made that
coriell.org/Sections/Membership/EnrollmentConsent.aspx?CoriellReg=Y
&PgId=9&id=38 (last visited May 5, 2014).
154. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f).
155. Mark Wicclair & Michael DeVita, Oversight of Research Involving the
Dead, 14 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 143 (2004). See also WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (WHO), GENETIC DATABASES: ASSESSING THE BENEFITS AND THE
IMPACT ON HUMAN AND PATIENT RIGHTS (2003) (‘The death of an
individual who has provided a genetic sample or genetic information
does not represent the end of the ethical responsibilities that are owed in
respect of the samples or information.”).
156. U.N. EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. (UNESCO), HUMAN GENETIC DATA:
PRELIMINARY STUDY BY THE IBC ON ITS COLLECTION, PROCESSING,
STORAGE
AND
USE
18,
available
at
http://portal.
unesco.org/shs/en/files/2138/10563744931Rapfinal
gendataen.
pdf/
Rapfinalgendata en.pdf.
157. Million Veteran Program, U.S. DEP’T VETS.
www.research.va.gov/mvp/ (last visited May 5, 2014).

AFF.

http://

158. Joel Kupersmith, The Million Veterans Program: Building VA’s MegaDatabase for Genomic Medicine, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 19, 2012),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/11/19/the-million-veteran-programbuilding-vas-mega- database-for-genomic-medicine/print/.
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the cost concerns raised by requiring samples to be analyzed at CLIAcertified laboratories are outweighed by the potential health benefits
of returning results that are medically significant.

V. Genomic Testing
Testing in aid of medical diagnosis or treatment raises ethical and
legal concerns. Whether physicians can order HIV tests and drug
screens without patient consent has been especially contentious, but
objections also have been made to the widespread physician practice
of ordering other “routine” medical tests without informing patients
of the nature of the tests and obtaining their consent. 159
When the testing in question is genomic, special concerns arise
because the testing laboratory obtains access to the patient’s DNA,
which contains the patient’s entire genetic code rather than just
information about the targeted illness. One issue that has been
discussed earlier, for example, is whether the physician has a duty to
inform the patient about “incidental” findings relevant to the
patient’s health.
When addressing ethical and legal concerns of genomic testing, it
is common to distinguish between predictive genomic testing, which
aims to ascertain if a person is at risk for a genomic illness in the
future, and non-predictive testing, that is, testing to diagnose or aid
in treating a manifested illness. As discussed earlier, military
physicians can be expected to employ genomic testing for nonpredictive purposes in the same manner as their civilian colleagues,
that is, to help diagnose and treat illness in their military patients.
Non-predictive genomic testing generally has been less controversial,
since it tends to be viewed as analogous to other types of medical
testing. For example, a provision in Massachusetts state law
prohibiting genetic testing without informed consent excludes “any
test for the purpose of diagnosing or detecting an existing disease,
illness, impairment or disorder” from its definition of “genetic test.” 160
But even when it is performed for non-predictive purposes, genomic
testing can yield information about the patient’s risks for future
illnesses, which can lead to social stigma if it becomes known to
others and discrimination if it gets into the hands of employers or
health insurers. From an ethical and legal standpoint, then, there is
no meaningful difference between predictive and non-predictive
genomic testing, and in the civilian sector, there is a clear consensus
159. See, e.g., Clarence H. Braddock III et al., Informed Decision Making in
Outpatient Practice, 282 JAMA 2313 (1999); Clarence H. Braddock III
et al., How Doctors and Patients Discuss Routine Clinical Decisions, 12
J. GEN. INT. MED. 339 (1997).
160. Mass. Gen. laws, c. 111, § 70G(a) (2013).
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that no genomic testing should be performed without an individual’s
informed consent. 161
As discussed previously, however, the bioethical principles that
govern military life are different from those that apply to civilians.
The health status of warfighters not only affects their well-being, but
the well-being of the unit, the success of the mission, and the security
of the state. Unlike civilians, therefore, warfighters are not free to
refuse necessary medical care, including medical testing. 162 Should the
fact that a test is genomic change this rule, that is, should warfighters
be able to refuse a genomic test, and should the answer be the same
when the genomic test is predictive rather than in aid of diagnosis or
treatment? Finally, should warfighters be able to refuse genomic
testing that pertains to non-disease characteristics, such as physical
and mental abilities?
Despite the special concerns raised by genomic testing, a strong
argument can be made that it should be subject to the same rules as
other types of military medical testing, meaning that warfighters
cannot refuse to submit to genomic testing, including when it is
predictive rather than in aid of treatment and diagnosis. As noted
earlier, providing a blood sample for DNA testing under AFRRSSIR
161. See, e.g., Genetic Testing by Employers, Opinion 2.132(2)(e), AM. MED.
ASS’N (Jun. 1991), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physicianresources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2132.page, Ethical
Issues in Carrier Screening of Genetic Disorders, Opinion 2.137, AM.
MED. ASS’N (Jun. 1994), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physicianresources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2137.page,
and
Multiplex Genetic Testing, Opinion 2.139, AM. MED. ASS’N (Jun. 1998),
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/
pub/physician-resources/medicalethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2139.page; Lois Snyder, American
College of Physicians Ethics, Professionalism, and Human Rights
Committee, American College of Physicians Ethics Manual: Sixth
Edition, 156 ANNALS INT. MED. 73 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12–
2803 (a health care provider shall not conduct a genetic test on a person
unless the health care provider first obtains written informed consent
from the person to be tested or from the person’s authorized
representative); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(2)(a) (DNA analysis may be
performed only with the informed consent of the person to be tested);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.151(1) to (6) (It is unlawful to obtain any
genetic information of a person without first obtaining the informed
consent of the person or the person’s legal guardian); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
24–21–3(A) (no person shall obtain genetic information or samples for
genetic analysis from a person without first obtaining informed and
written consent from the person or the person’s authorized
representative); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9332(d) (no genetic testing
shall be performed on any individual or body parts of any individual nor
shall any bodily materials be released for purposes of genetic testing
without the prior written authorization and informed consent of the
individual to be tested).
162. U.S. Army Regulation 600–20 (2012).
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is mandatory, and its mandatory nature has been upheld by the
courts. Furthermore, the Military Rules of Evidence governing
proceedings under the Uniform Military Code of Justice provide that,
while communications between a patient and psychotherapist—
arguably the most sensitive type of medical information—are
privileged, the privilege does not apply when the information is
“necessary to ensure the safety and security of military personnel . . .
or the accomplishment of a military mission.” 163 Moreover, although
the military in a sense is an employer of its personnel, it is not subject
to the prohibition in GINA against requiring employees to undergo
genomic testing. In any event, there is some sentiment that GINA
should be amended to allow employers to use genomic testing that
could identify job applicants who might pose a threat to the safety of
others as a result of their genomic endowment. 164
At the same time, however, military genomic testing is subject to
the principles of proportionality and paternalism that govern military
bioethics generally, so it may only be undertaken if accountable
superiors determine that the risks, including loss of privacy and
potential breaches of confidentiality, are outweighed by military
necessity. This is especially important in the case of genomic testing
for non-disease characteristics. The military has a legitimate interest
in obtaining information about warfighters” physical and mental
abilities, including genomic information, but only if the genomic test
is a valid indicator of what it purports to show and the information is
necessary in order to carry out the mission. Furthermore, as noted
earlier, the military has adopted the privacy rules of HIPAA,
including the limitation on disclosure of protected health information
to the minimum necessary to accomplish the purpose of the
disclosure, 165 and the requirement that the information must be kept
secure.
Finally, the military must be mindful of relying too heavily on the
results of genomic tests that have not been adequately validated. The
popular press is quick to tout purported links between genomic factors
and traits or conditions that often turn out to be false or
overstated. 166 Although military exigencies may create a compelling
need for genomic data, the data must be viewed with caution until
they are adequately confirmed. This raises the question of under what
circumstances the military is entitled to rely on genomic technologies
that have not yet been fully tested, discussed in the following section.
163. Manual for Courts-Martial United States, Rule 513(d)(6) (2012).
164. Noah Levin, A Defense of Genetic Discrimination, 43 HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 33 (2013).
165. DODR 6025.18-R, supra note 109, at § C8.2.1.
166. See, e.g., Joel N. Hirschhorn, A Comprehensive Review of Genetic
Association Studies,4 GENET. MED. 45 (2002).
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VI. Deployment Use of Unproven Genomic
Technologies
As described earlier, the military has an interest in giving troops
gene-based technologies that could help protect them, treat injury and
illness, and improve their performance. Earlier, this article discussed
ethical and legal issues surrounding the testing of these interventions
in military and civilian subjects. But the military might not want to
pass up the opportunity to provide a promising genomic intervention
to warfighters, especially those in harm’s way, even though the
intervention had not undergone complete testing for safety and
efficacy.
A similar situation, although not involving genomic technologies,
arose with the distribution of pyridostigmine bromide (PB) and
botulinum toxoid (BT) vaccine to troops during the Gulf War, and
with the DoD’s Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (AVIP),
which began in 1998. These modalities were given to troops to protect
against chemical and biological weapons rather than solely to
determine whether or not they actually worked. In other words, they
were deployment uses rather than formal research studies. At the
time, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had approved PB for
treatment of myasthenia gravis, but not for protection against nerve
agents, 167 while at the start of the AVIP Program, the anthrax vaccine
was approved by the FDA to protect against cutaneous exposure but
not against the airborne exposure that DoD expected. (The FDA
approved anthrax vaccine for all routes of exposure in 2004. 168)
Therefore, these were “off-label” or “unapproved” uses, a common
medical practice. The FDA had not approved BT vaccine for any use
at the time of the Gulf War, but the vaccine had an odd history; it
was the only vaccine available against botulinum toxin, had been used
by doctors to protect people against it for years, and was
manufactured for that purpose by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention under an investigational new drug exemption, 169 the

167. William J. FitzPatrick & Lee L. Zwanziger, Defending Against
Biochemical Warfare: Ethical Issues Involving the Coercive Use of
Investigational Drugs and Biologics in the Military,3 J. PHIL. SCI. L. 1
(2003).
168. Parasidis, supra note 57.
169. Statement of Randolph E. Wykoff, Assoc. Comm’r for Ops, Food &
Drug Adm., on Medical, Chemical, and Biological Warfare
Preparedness before the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs, FOOD &
DRUG ADM. (Mar. 17, 1998), http://www.fda.gov/ NewsEvents/
Testimony/ucm115125.htm.
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FDA”s mechanism for allowing unapproved products to travel legally
across state lines. 170
These deployment uses generated controversy over whether they
should be voluntary, that is, whether troops should be allowed to
refuse to take the drug and the vaccines. One concern was that
making deployment use mandatory would encourage the military to
use it to circumvent the informed consent requirements of formal
research. Ultimately, Congress decided that drugs could be given to
troops off-label only if a waiver of informed consent was issued by the
President 171 or under an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) granted
by the FDA during a national emergency, and then not to all
members of the armed forces but only to troops “in a particular
military operation.” 172 The same legal restrictions currently would
apply to the deployment use of unapproved or off-label genomic
technologies. In addition, the military should only seek a Presidential
waiver or an EUA when the use of these genomic technologies would
170. Some sources including the FDA and DoD itself described the Gulf War
use of these drugs as “investigational.” FitzPatrick & Zwanziger, supra
note 165. But this is a misnomer. FDA regulations define
‘investigational’ as a drug or biological drug “that is used in a clinical
investigation,” (21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b)) that is, in a safety and efficacy
study conducted with human subjects. Neither PB nor BT vaccine was
being studied in a formal clinical investigation; no manufacturer was
conducting studies at the time, and most commentators do not consider
the Gulf War use to be formal research, since although the DoD clearly
was interested in seeing what effect PB and BT vaccines had on the
troops who took them, the primary intent was to protect troops against
attack rather than to produce generalizable knowledge. DoD evidently
called the Gulf War uses “investigative” because it felt that its actions
sufficiently resembled human subjects research that, under current law,
the troops would need to give their informed consent before taking
them. DoD deemed this to be impractical under combat conditions, but
was concerned that proceeding without informed consent would be
illegal and appear to violate the Nuremberg Code. It therefore asked the
FDA to establish a special procedure whereby troops could be given the
products without their consent. RICHARD A. RETTIG, MILITARY USE OF
DRUGS NOT YET APPROVED BY THE FDA FOR CW/BW DEFENSE:
LESSONS FROM THE GULF WAR (1990). The result was an “interim rule”
permitting the Commissioner of the FDA to waive the need for informed
consent so that DoD could use “investigational” products for military
purposes. Food and Drug Administration, Informed Consent for Human
Drugs and Biologics; Determination that Informed Consent is Not
Feasible, 55 Fed. Reg. 52814 (1990). Gulf War veterans unsuccessfully
challenged the interim rule in court [John Doe and Mary Doe v.
Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12 (USDC 1991); Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370
(US App DC 1991)]. In 1999, Congress transferred the authority to
grant the waiver from the Commission of the FDA to the President (10
U.S.C. § 1107(f) (1999)).
171. 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f) (1999).
172. Project BioShield Act of 2004 (Pub. Law 108–276).
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be ethical, that is, when it would comply with the principles of
proportionality, paternalism, and fairness. Commanders should
carefully consider the available evidence concerning the risks and
benefits of the technology in question and determine that there is no
less risky alternative, so that imposing the risks on troops would be
necessary in order to accomplish the mission.

VII. The Role of Military Physicians
With the possible exception of deployment uses, warfighter access
to genomic technologies will be through a physician intermediary,
whether as a researcher, clinician, or operator of a genomic testing
program. This raises the question of what obligations military
physicians owe to military personnel. Some commentators claim that
physicians in the military should behave no differently than
physicians in the civilian world and that the same ethical norms and
legal rules should apply. The World Medical Association, for example,
states that “medical ethics in times of armed conflict is identical to
medical ethics in times of peace,” 173 bioethicist Peter Clark asserts
that “the failure of medical professionals to recognize that military
and civic duty can never trump medical ethical principles is clearly an
injustice,” 174 and Sidel and Levy go so far as to claim that “it is
morally unacceptable for a physician to serve as both a physician and
a soldier in the United States military forces ...,” 175 leaving open the
question of who is going to provide medical services in the military.
As noted earlier, the civilian bioethical principle that the welfare
of the individual patient is the paramount is in conflict with the
military principle that the welfare of the individual is subordinate to
the welfare of the unit, the success of the mission, and the security of
the state. As Edmund Howe emphasizes, “the military physician, at
least implicitly, promises to support the mission or greater good when
and if this is necessary, even if this requires subordinating the medical
well-being of the individual soldier.” 176 If military doctors acted
according to civilian principles of bioethics when they provided
services to their own troops, they might find themselves having to
173. Gross, supra note 43, at 101.
174. Peter Clark, Medical Ethics at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib: The
Problem of Dual Loyalty, 34 J. L. Med. Ethics 577 (2006).
175. Victor W. Sidel & Barry S. Levy, Physician-Soldier: A Moral Dilemma?,
in 1 TEXTBOOKS OF MILITARY MEDICINE: MILITARY MEDICAL ETHICS 312
(Edmund D. Pelegrino, Anthony E. Hartle, Edmund G. Howe & Walter
Reed eds., 2004).
176. Edmund G. Howe, Mixed Agency in Military Medicine: Ethical Roles in
Conflict, in 1 TEXTBOOKS OF MILITARY MEDICINE: MILITARY MEDICAL
ETHICS 333 (Edmund D. Pelegrino, Anthony E. Hartle, Edmund G.
Howe & Walter Reed eds., 2004).
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violate the fundamental principle of military bioethics. Consequently,
the rules governing military physicians cannot be the same as those
that govern civilians.
Military physicians are still medical professionals, however, and
while this status cannot relieve them of their obligations as members
of the military, it imposes on them a special obligation to look out for
the interests of warfighters for whom they are responsible. Due to
their medical expertise, they should be in a better position than
nonphysicians to assess biomedical risks and benefits, and therefore
they have a duty to apply their medical expertise to determine if a
genomic risk that commanders seek to impose on their subordinates is
disproportionate. If physicians disagree with the commanders”
judgement, they must take the matter up the chain of command until
they are satisfied that their professional concerns have received due
consideration. As Canadian brigadier general and former director of
Canadian military health services Hilary Jaeger states, “the military
physician must act as a counterweight, by being the voice of caution,”
and “should not hesitate to challenge when they are not satisfied.” 177
A prime example of the special protective role of military
physicians in fact involves a genomic technology, a recombinantDNA-manufactured clotting agent called Factor VII. 178 The army
introduced the product into clinical practice in Iraq in 2004 before
full-scale testing, which later revealed both safety problems, such as
an increased risk of blot clots that could cause strokes 179 and a lack of
efficacy. 180 Army physicians in Baghdad became concerned in 2006
about the safety and efficacy of the clotting agent and urged their

177. Hillary F. Jaeger, A Glance at the Tip of a Big Iceberg: Commentary on
‘Recommendations for the Ethical use of Pharmacological Fatigue
Countermeasures in the US Military’, 78 AVIATION, SPACE ENVTL. MED.
B128 (2007).
178. According to the package insert, Factor VII, brand-name NovoSeven, is
produced by cloning the gene for human Factor VII, expressing it in
baby hamster kidney cells, secreting it into a culture media containing
newborn calf serum in its single-chain form, and then proteolytically
converting it by auto- catalysis to the active two-chain form during a
chromatographic purification process. See generally NovoNordisk:
NovoSeven, FOOD & DRUG ADM. (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.
fda.gov/downloads/biologicsbloodvaccines/bloodbloodproducts/approved
products/licensedproductsblas/fractionatedplasmaproducts/ucm056915.
pdf.
179. Alex Berenson, Army’s Aggressive Surgeon Is Too Aggressive for Some,
N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2007), http://www. nytimes.com/ 2007/
11/06/health/06prof.html?pagewanted=all.
180. Robert Little, Army Medicine: Untested in Battle, BALT. SUN (Mar. 29,
2009),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nation-world/bal-te.
militarymed29mar29,0,7320913,full.story.
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superiors in the medical chain of command to curtail its use. This led
to rebukes from their superiors. 181

VIII. Genomic Enhancement
Ethical and legal issues raised by military human subjects
research on genomic enhancements were discussed earlier in Balancing
Risks and Benefits. This section addresses the issues raised by giving
genomic enhancements to troops outside of research, such as during
training or deployment. Genomic enhancement technologies raise
some of the same ethical and legal concerns that have been discussed
in connection with other genomic technologies, for example, whether
warfighters must be asked for informed consent. The question here is
whether the fact that the genomic technology is an enhancement
rather than medically related calls for different treatment.
Generally speaking, the answer is no. The fact that a genomic test
seeks information about a warfighter’s physical or mental abilities
rather than their risk for genomic disease, for example, does not alter
the ground rules for military genomic testing described in Genomic
Testing, which mandate that any risks from the testing be
proportionate to the military’s need for the information and that
superiors protect the warfighter’s welfare to the greatest extent
possible. The same is true for a genomic intervention such as a
recombinant-DNA-manufactured drug, an example of which would be
erythropoietin, which provides greater endurance by increasing the
oxygen supply to tissues, or even a direct genomic manipulation that
aims to improve warfighter performance. In all these cases, the same
considerations of safety, efficacy, proportionality, paternalism, and
fairness obtain.
One reason for not making special rules for genomic enhancement
is that the distinction between an enhancement and other sorts of
genomic technologies is difficult to make. Consider a recombinant
drug that improves mental ability or endurance. Is this an
enhancement or a preventive medical measure that helps prevent
warfighters from becoming ill or injured? Some commentators argue
that an enhancement is something that enables an individual to
exceed population norms for the characteristic or ability. Thus, a drug
to improve cognitive function in persons with below-normal cognitive
ability would not be considered an enhancement. But the concept of
normality is elusive. In some cases, it refers to the frequency with
which a trait or capability occurs within a population. In regard to
height, the convention is to regard individuals who are more than two
standard deviations below the mean height of the population as being

181. Id.
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of short stature. 182 In other circumstances, what is considered normal
may have no relationship to the distribution of a trait. For example,
normal eyesight is deemed to be 20/20, but only about 35 percent of
adults have 20/20 vision without some form of correction. 183 Standards
of normality also may vary from place to place and time to time, and
can be expected to change as the use of enhancements increases. Body
shapes that were considered healthy a 100 years ago, for instance, are
now considered obese. Furthermore, the concepts of disease and
disorder themselves may be hard to pin down. Before 1973, the
American Psychiatric Association regarded homosexuality as a mental
disorder. 184 Moreover, there is a tendency to regard more and more
health states as diseases and more and more interventions as
treatments. Instead of attempting to make a brightline distinction
between enhancements and other techniques, the emphasis should be
on the effect of the intervention on the well-being of the warfighters
who receive the intervention, the welfare of their units, and the
completion of the mission.
Are there certain types of biomedical enhancements that should
be out of bounds in the military? Arguably enhancements should not
compromise warfighter dignity by producing socially stigmatizing or
disfiguring physical characteristics. In the debate about the ethics and
legality of human genomic engineering, one technology that causes
particular concern, for example, is intermixing human and animal
DNA. 185 Critics object that even using this technology to combat
disease, let alone for enhancement purposes, should be prohibited due
to the risk of creating monsters 186 and blurring the line between
humans and other animals. 187 On the other hand, an argument can be
made that the benefits from giving warfighters an eagle’s daytime
vision, an owl’s night vision, a dog’s sense of smell, a gorilla’s
182. Short stature: Criteria for Determining Disability in Infants and
Children, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE
RES. & QUALITY (Mar. 2003), http://www. ahrq.gov/clinic/
epcsums/shortsum.htm.
183. Tim Johnson, What is 20/20 vision?, UNIV. IOWA HOSPS. & CLINICS,
https://www.uihealthcare.org/2column.aspx?id=225702 (last visited
May 5, 2014).
184. Let’s Talk Facts Brochures: Sexual Orientation, AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N,
http://www.psychiatry.org/mental-health/people/lgbt-sexualorientation (last visited May 5, 2014).
185. See Organ Farms, PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/ wgbh/ pages/
frontline/shows/organfarm/etc/faqs.html (last visited May 5, 2014).
186. JOHN HARRIS, ENHANCING EVOLUTION: THE ETHICAL CASE
BETTER PEOPLE 38 (2007).
187. JONATHAN GLOVER, WHAT SORT
(1984).
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strength, or a cheetah’s speed might be so great that they should not
be ruled out of the question. From a technical standpoint, however, it
may well be necessary to produce such changes at a sufficiently early
stage of embryonic development that the alterations showed up in all
of the resulting individual’s cells, including their reproductive cells,
and therefore would be passed on to their descendants. 188 In short,
germ line genomic engineering. This is another genomic approach that
meets with strong objections, including that it could cause
inadvertent harm to future generations. 189 The question then would be
whether the military ought to be allowed to produce modifications
that made the offspring of their personnel especially valuable as
warfighters if the same types of changes were forbidden in the general
population. This scenario is sufficiently far in the future that it
doesn’t have to be resolved at this time, but one conclusion that
seems certain even now is that such modifications would be unethical
without the warfighter’s informed consent.
Another ethical issue is what effect genomic enhancement use
should have on promotions, commendations, and other rewards within
the military. If warfighters are required to take the enhancements,
then it does not seem justified to deprive them of resulting service
benefits so long as access to the enhancements is fairly distributed.
On the other hand, if warfighters use enhancements voluntarily, the
situation might be thought to resemble enhancements in sport, where
it is argued that abilities or accomplishments attributable in
substantial part to enhancements do not deserve reward. As in the
case of sports, however, one must inquire why from an ethical
standpoint biomedical enhancements should be treated differently
than permissible performance improving practices such as dietary
modification and extreme training. Moreover, unlike in sport, where
the use of enhancements may confer benefits on individual athletes
and teams but produce little or no broader societal benefit,
enhancements in the military could help protect warfighters and their
comrades from harm, and aid them in accomplishing missions deemed
to be in the national interest. In terms of the impact on military
rewards, then, the willingness of warfighters to incur health risks from
enhancements in order to benefit others as well as themselves might
be deemed to be praiseworthy.

188. See, e.g., Mark Frankel, Audrey Chapman & American Association for
the Advancement of Science, Human Inheritable Genetic Modifications:
Assessing Scientific, Ethical, Religious, and Policy Issues, AM. ASS’N
FOR ADV. SCI.
(2000), http://www.aaas.org/ sites/default/files/
migrate/uploads/germline.pdf.
189. Emily Marden & Dorothy Nelkin, Displaced Agendas: Current
Regulatory Strategies for Germline Gene Therapy, 45 MCGILL L. J. 461,
468 (2000).
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An additional concern is the potential for genomic enhancement
technology to migrate from the military to the civilian sector. The
successful development of enhancements for the military is likely to
become publicly known and create pressure to make them available to
civilians, including from entities that have a proprietary interest in
the technologies. Warfighters also might illegally distribute
enhancements that they were given for military use to family
members and other civilians. Just as the military legitimately
prohibits public access to properly classified information and
dangerous weaponry, it would be appropriate to prevent the public
from gaining access to military enhancements that were overly
dangerous or that were so effective that it would threaten national
security if they became available to adversaries.
A final question is whether warfighters should be allowed to
benefit from being enhanced after they are discharged from the
military or retire. The ability to do so, for example, might be used as
a recruiting incentive, similar to being taught technical skills. A
fairness issue would arise, however, if former warfighters continued to
enjoy advantages from enhancements that were not readily available
to civilians because they were illegal or too expensive. On the one
hand, continued advantage might seem unfair to civilians who were
not eligible for military service. On the other hand, enhancement
advantages could be viewed as a legitimate part of warfighters”
compensation package, especially if they were in combat or had been
given other especially risky assignments. Similar considerations arise
in connection with other veterans benefits such as governmentsubsidized college education, job preferences, and access to VA care;
in all cases, the public must decide whether the benefits are justified
based on factors such as the need for military volunteers and the
value of the benefit compared to what is available to civilians. In the
case of genomic enhancements, an additional issue is how difficult or
dangerous it would be to remove or cancel the effect of the
warfighter’s enhancement.

IX. Conclusion
Although genomic technologies could produce significant benefits
for the military and its individual members, they must be subject to
appropriate ethical and legal constraints. The bioethical principles
that underlie these constraints differ between military and civilian
contexts, and therefore the rules that govern the military use of
genomic technologies also must be different.
Given the exigencies of military operations and national security,
the military in many respects deserves to have greater freedom to
conduct research using military subjects, obtain genomic information
from military personnel, create and establish military geno–
phenobanks, and provide genomic therapies and enhancements to
warfighters than would be ethically acceptable in civilian biomedical
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contexts. Nevertheless, warfighters deserve to be respected and to
have their welfare maximized as much as possible under the
circumstances. The essence of military bioethics is the duty of
superiors to protect their subordinate’s welfare and impose risks on
them only to the extent that the risk is appropriate in light of the
military benefits to be gained. Given the scientific uncertainty
surrounding many aspects of genomics, public sensitivity to genomic
misconduct, and the importance of maintaining an effective voluntary
military force, adherence to these principles in the realm of genomics
is especially critical.
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